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to examine  the adequacy of  fiscal management, government  forecasting, and 
transparency of public expenditure, and  to provide  for greater  independence 




research  and  analytical  offices  being  established  with  varying  mandates, 
functions and authority. Australia’s Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), which 
began  operation  in  July  2012,  is  one  of  10  such  offices  established  in OECD 
countries since 2007. 
Background to the establishment of Australia’s PBO 
2. In  Australia,  the  merits  of  establishing  an  independent  fiscal  policy 
analysis body had been raised by various political parties since at  least 2005. 
However, it was not until August 2010 that, as part of the formation of the then 
minority  Government,  the  Agreement  for  a  Better  Parliament  specified  that  a 
Parliamentary Budget Office would be established. 
3. Subsequently,  in  November  2010,  the  Joint  Select  Committee  on  the 
Parliamentary Budget Office  (the  Joint  Select Committee) was  established  to 
report on the appropriate mandate for the PBO; the nature of the information 
needed by the Parliament; and the role and adequacy of current institutions in 
providing  this  information.  The  committee  also  considered  the  operation  of 
similar offices  in other  jurisdictions, and  the contribution of  the Departments 
of  the  Treasury  (Treasury)  and  Finance  (Finance)  in  undertaking  policy 
costings through the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (the Charter of Budget 
Honesty).  The  Charter  of  Budget  Honesty  provides  a  framework  for  the 
conduct  of  government  fiscal  policy,  and  among  other  things,  sets  out  the 
                                                     
1  Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office, Inquiry into the Proposed Parliamentary 
Budget Office, March 2011, p. 7. 
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arrangements  for  election  policy  costings  to  be  prepared  by  Treasury  or 
Finance during the caretaker period for Federal elections.2 
4. The  Joint  Select  Committee  tabled  its  report  in  Parliament  on 
23 March 2011,  and  the  then  Government  agreed  in  full  to  23  of  the 
28 recommendations,  and  in  principle  to  the  other  five.  Recommendations 




budget  frameworks.  It will  bring  greater  accountability  and  transparency  to 
policy  costings  processes,  particularly  during  election  periods.  And  it  will 
ensure that no party or member of parliament will have an excuse to avoid the 
scrutiny of its policy costings. It will ensure that the Australian public can be 
better  informed  about  the  costs of  election policy proposals before  they  cast 
their vote at the election.3 
5. Legislation  establishing  the  PBO  received  royal  assent  on 
4 December 20114,  and  the  PBO  began  operation  on  23 July 2012  with  the 
appointment  of  the  Parliamentary  Budget  Officer.  The  PBO  is  one  of  four 
parliamentary  departments  supporting  the  Australian  Parliament,  and  in 
2013–14,  the PBO  had  budgeted program  expenses  of  $7.7 million  and  as  at 
April 2014, had 35 staff. 
Purpose and functions of the PBO 





Budget  Officer;  considering  the  operations  and  resources  of  the  PBO;  and 
reporting  to  Parliament  on  relevant  matters  relating  to  the  PBO.  The 
                                                     
2  The caretaker period is the period preceding an election for the House of Representatives. It begins at 
the time the House of Representatives is dissolved and continues until the election result is clear or, if 
there is a change of government, until the new government is appointed. 
3  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Service Amendment 
(Parliamentary Budget Officer) Bill 2011, Second reading, 24 August 2011, W Swan MP, p. 9142. 
4  The Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Officer) Act 2011 amended the 
Parliamentary Service Act 1999, the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998, and the Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 to establish the PBO and the office of Parliamentary Budget Officer. 
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 outside  the  caretaker  period  for  a  general  election,  to  prepare  policy 








 after  a  general  election,  to  report  on  election  commitments  of 
designated parliamentary parties6; and 




documents  prepared  by  the  PBO  that  related  to  confidential  requests  were 
exempt  from access under  the Freedom  of  Information Act  1982  (FOI Act), but 
documents held by Commonwealth agencies were not specifically exempted. 
A  legislative  amendment  to protect  the  confidentiality of  these  records  from 
freedom of information requests received royal assent on 4 December 2012. A 
further legislative amendment, passed in June 2013, allowed the PBO the same 
access  to  Australian  Taxation  Office  data  as  Treasury  for  compiling  budget 
revenue estimates.  
8. The  PBO’s  capacity  to  perform  its  functions  is  heavily  reliant  on  its 
ability  to  access  information  (both  data  and  costing  models  used  to  cost 
policies). Access to information from Commonwealth agencies is facilitated by 
the  Australian  Government  Protocols  governing  the  engagement  between 
                                                     
5  These requests and costings are to be made public, consistent with those prepared under caretaker 
period costing provisions of the Charter of Budget Honesty by Treasury and Finance. 
6  In June 2013, the Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Officer) Act 2013 
expanded the PBO’s mandate to include the requirement for reporting on the election commitments of 
designated parliamentary parties. Other amendments made by this Act are discussed in 
paragraph 2.42. 
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Memorandum  of Understanding  between  the Parliamentary Budget Officer  and  the 
heads  of  Commonwealth  bodies  in  relation  to  the  provision  of  information  and 
documents (the MoU). 
International comparison 
9. Internationally,  specialist  budget  offices  such  as  Australia’s  PBO  are 
collectively known as Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs), and there are some 
key  contrasts  between  their  mandates.7  Most  have  a  role  in  preparing  or 
assessing  macroeconomic  assumptions  and  analysing  long‐term  fiscal 
sustainability. However, of the 17 IFIs  in OECD countries, six have no role  in 
monitoring compliance with fiscal rules (Australia, Canada, Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands  and  the  United  States);  two  have  no  role  in  macroeconomics 
(Australia  and  the  Slovak  Republic);  and  only  two  prepare  election  policy 
costings (Australia and the Netherlands). 
Audit objective, criteria and scope 
10. The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of the Parliamentary 
Budget Office in conducting its role since being established in July 2012. 
11. In order  to  form a  conclusion against  this audit objective,  the ANAO 
adopted the following high level criteria: 
 effective  governance  and  administrative  arrangements  were 
established, to support the delivery of services to the Parliament; 










7  The OECD has avoided setting a strict definition for IFIs because of the variation in mandates, functions 
and authority between these offices. OECD, OECD Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions, 
Working party for Senior Budget Officials, OECD Network of Parliamentary Budget Officials and 
Independent Fiscal Institutions, 12 February 2013, p. 3. 
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13. This  audit  has  been  conducted  under  subsection  15(1)  of  the 
Auditor‐General  Act  1997.8  In  conducting  this  audit,  the  Australian  National 
Audit Office  (ANAO) was mindful  of  the  Parliamentary  Service Act, which 
allows  the  JCPAA  to  request an  independent  review of  the operations of  the 
PBO, to be completed within nine months after a general election. The ANAO 
briefed  the  JCPAA  on  the planning  for  this  audit—its  objective,  criteria  and 
expected  tabling  date  (planned  for  completion  within  nine  months  of  the 
general election held on 7 September 2013). 
14. In  conducting  the  audit,  the ANAO was  aware  of  the Government’s 
National  Commission  of  Audit  and  its  terms  of  reference,  which  included 
identifying  options  for  strengthening  Commonwealth  budgeting 
arrangements,  incorporating  an  examination  of  the  role  of  the  PBO.  The 
Commission’s  report  was  released  publicly  on  1  May  2014.  The  report 
contained a  recommendation  for  the Government  to adopt a high‐level  fiscal 
strategy with  fiscal rules which set out how a  fiscal strategy will be achieved 
(Recommendation  1).  With  reference  to  the  PBO,  the  Commission 
recommended  that  the  PBO  reports  the  Government’s  progress  against  the 
fiscal  rules  following  the  release  of  the  Final  Budget  Outcome  each  year 
(Recommendation 2).  The  Government  has  not  yet  responded  to  these 
recommendations, however, the additional function for the PBO suggested  in 




15. Prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  PBO  in  July 2012,  there  was  no 
independent body in Australia that specialised in the research and analysis of 
fiscal policy  for  the Federal Parliament. At  this  time,  there were also  limited 
resources  for  non‐government  political  parties,  individual  and  independent 
members of parliament to have policies costed outside of the caretaker period 
for a general election. The establishment of the PBO was expected to: help level 
the playing  field  for all parliamentarians by providing non‐partisan access  to 
policy  costings  (outside  of  and during  the  caretaker period),  budgetary  and 
                                                     
8  Under subsection 15(1) of the Auditor-General Act 1997, the Auditor-General may at any time conduct 
a performance audit of an agency. 
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fiscal policy analysis; and  improve  the  transparency of Australia’s budgetary 
frameworks.  
16. Since  commencing  operation  in  July  2012,  the  PBO  has  effectively 
undertaken its statutory role and is already well regarded as an authoritative, 
trusted  and  independent  source of budgetary  and  fiscal policy  analysis. The 
PBO has made a  significant  contribution  to  levelling  the playing  field  for all 
parliamentarians.  Stakeholders9  consulted during  the  course  of  this  audit  all 
agreed that, for the first time, all parliamentarians have access to independent 
policy  costing  and  information  request  services  during  all  periods  of  the 
parliamentary  cycle.  In addition, parliamentary and peer group  stakeholders 
viewed  the costings prepared by  the PBO as being of high quality, and  those 
involved  in  the costing process agreed  that  the PBO was professional  to deal 
with. These  stakeholders also agreed  that  the PBO’s work has  improved  the 
transparency  around  election  commitments,  and  facilitated  a more  informed 
public debate about budgetary matters that has the potential to increase as the 
PBO  releases  further  information  and  the  public  becomes  better  educated 
about these topics. 
Establishment and governance of the PBO 
17. The PBO was established at a time in the Federal election cycle when an 
election  had  to  be  held  by  November  2013,  but  could  be  held  earlier. 
Consequently,  the PBO had a  limited  timeframe of about  two months  (from 
establishment in July 2012 to accepting requests for work in September 2012) in 
which  to  implement  the  necessary  governance  and  administrative 
arrangements to be in a position to respond to requests for policy costings and 
information  from parliamentarians.  In  the expected  intense period of activity 
before the forthcoming election,  implementation planning was  important and 
key  elements  were  incorporated  into  the  PBO’s  first  annual  work  plan, 
released on 12 October 2012.  
18. Liaison  with  Treasury  and  Finance  occurred  frequently  during  the 
establishment  of  the  PBO.  The  PBO  advised  the  ANAO  that  of  particular 
importance  for  the  PBO  was  access  to  the  information  holdings  of  these 
departments, and arrangements for coordinating the policy costings workload 
                                                     
9  The ANAO interviewed representatives of the Coalition, the Australian Labor Party, the Australian 
Greens and Mr Andrew Wilkie MP, as well as Prof. Peter Shergold AC, Mr Len Scanlan, Mr Geoff 
Carmody, Mr Chris Richardson and Mr John Daley. 
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during  the  caretaker  period  to  avoid  duplication.10  Temporary  staff  were 
seconded  (the  majority  already  experienced  in  fiscal  analysis  and  policy 
costings  from working at Treasury and Finance) and permanent  recruitment 
commenced  in  late  2012.  In  preparation  for  the  peak  workload  of  the 
2013 election period,  the PBO’s  internal business plans  (prepared  for  January 
to  June  2013)  appropriately  incorporated  planning  for  a  ‘surge’  capacity. 
Strategies included the flexible deployment of PBO staff across work areas, the 
use of contractors, and preparatory training for staff.  
19. Despite  the  intense period  of  activity  leading up  to  the  2013  Federal 
election, the PBO has established, or is in the process of finalising, appropriate 
governance  and  administrative  arrangements.  Self‐initiated  process 
improvements are underway and  the PBO has also  taken steps  to ensure  the 
security of its data and information technology (IT) systems but the associated 
governance documentation  is yet  to be  finalised. The PBO’s monitoring  and 
reporting of its performance is also well established. 
The PBO’s access to information 




facilitated  access  to  the  information  sources  necessary  for  conducting  its 
research and analysis. 
21. For  the  period  from  September 2012  to  April 2014,  the  PBO  made 
679 requests  for  information  from  52 Commonwealth  agencies.  The  median 
response  time  was  nine  business  days,  with  18 responses  taking  more  than 
51 business days.11 The  length of  time  taken by  an agency  to  respond  to  the 
PBO depends on a number of factors, including the ease of extracting historical 
data, other work priorities, the complexity of the request and how many other 
requests  the agency has at  the  time.  In  the ANAO’s  interviews with officers 
representing  20 of  the agencies  that  are  signatories  to  the MoU,  all  reported 
                                                     
10  Treasury’s and Finance’s mandates to prepare policy costings comes from the Charter of Budget 
Honesty. The PBO’s mandate comes from the Parliamentary Service Act 1999, but is aligned with 
guidelines issued by Treasury and Finance for preparing policy costings during the caretaker period. 
11  The timeframes for agencies to respond to requests for information (urgent within five days, routine 
within 10 days, and during the caretaker period within three days) are indicative, and agencies can 
negotiate timeframes with the PBO. Under the Charter Policy Costing Guidelines, the PBO endeavours 
to complete costings within five days.  
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adhering  to  the  intent of  the Protocols. However,  there were  instances where 
agencies  could  not  provide  certain  data  (as  they  did  not  hold  that  data,  or 
historical data would have taken too  long to collate) and where extensions to 
timeframes  were  necessary.  In  these  circumstances,  the  PBO  modified  its 
requests to obtain such information as was possible in the timeframe. 
22. The PBO advised the ANAO that to date, it has been able to access the 
information  it needs under  the Protocols and  the MoU, although on occasion 
there have been  long delays. However,  the PBO does not have access  to  the 
details  of  provisions  for  individual  items  included  in  the  Contingency 
Reserve.12 The Secretary of  the  then Department of Finance and Deregulation 
decided  that  providing  such  information  would  be  contrary  to  the  public 
interest. As a mitigating measure, the PBO has issued guidance stating that all 
PBO  costings  are  prepared  in  the  absence  of  this  information.  While  this 
constraint only affected two policy costings in preparing the 2013 Post‐Election 
Report13, the likelihood remains that the PBO may not be able to determine the 
net  budget  impact  of  certain policies  in  the  future  because  it does  not  have 
access to this information.  
23. Agencies  interviewed  by  the  ANAO  said  their  relationship  with  the 
PBO was positive. Nevertheless, agencies did  raise an  issue about  the PBO’s 
approach  to  requesting  information,  in  circumstances  where  the  requestor 
stipulated  confidentiality.  In  these  instances,  agencies  were  concerned  that 
they  may  not  be  providing  the  most  relevant  information  because  the  full 
details of the request were not known. Nine agencies felt that their responses 
would be better tailored and more accurate if the PBO had explicitly identified 
how  the  information  sought  would  be  used,  and  four  agencies  expressed 
concern  about  subsequently  being  expected  by  government  to  deliver 
programs within  the amount costed by  the PBO, even where  the costing was 
inaccurate because of imperfect data.  
                                                     
12  The Contingency Reserve is an allowance included in the aggregate expenses of the budget to reflect 
anticipated events that cannot be assigned to individual programs in the preparation of the Budget 
estimates—see Statement 6 of Budget Paper 1. The Reserve is designed to ensure that aggregate 
estimates are as close as possible to expected outcomes and is not intended to be a general policy 
reserve. The Reserve is not specifically mentioned in either the Protocols or the MoU. 
13  The two costings were: Regional Cooperation to Combat People Smuggling (Coalition) and Safer 
pathways for refugees policy, refugee health and end immigration detention (Australian Greens). As the 
former Government had included costs for operating the processing facilities on Nauru in the 
Contingency Reserve, the PBO was not aware of the quantum of the allowance made and, as a 
consequence, the potential savings from the non-operation of that facility in these two instances. 
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24. While  there  is  no  legislative  requirement  prohibiting  the  PBO  from 
disclosing  the  potential  use  of  the  information  being  requested14,  and  the 
Protocols and MoU require strict non‐disclosure by agencies of requests made 
by  the PBO,  the arguments  in  favour of confidentiality reflect  the  importance 
of  the  PBO  maintaining  confidence  among  its  primary  clients—
parliamentarians.15  Parliamentary  stakeholders‘  feedback  to  the  ANAO 
emphasised  the  importance  of  confidentiality  to  their  policy  development 
processes,  confirming  that  this  strengthens  the  PBO’s  capacity  to  provide 
assistance to parliament; allows costings to occur in a considered manner; and 
subsequently  improves  the  policy  debate.  One  party  commented  that  it 
recognised the confidentiality of the PBO’s information requests created a risk 
of the PBO producing  less accurate costings, but on balance, the party would 
be  more  concerned  if  this  confidentiality  was  relaxed  with  agencies.  The 
feedback from agencies referred to above nevertheless underlines the benefits 
of the PBO providing sufficient context in relation to each information request 
to position agencies  to provide  the most appropriate  information  in response 
to  requests,  while  being  respectful  of  maintaining  the  confidentiality  of  the 
policy proposal where this has been requested. 
Policy costings 
25. An  important component of policy development  is  the analysis of  the 
costs  and  benefits  of  a  range  of  approaches  to  the  policy’s  design.  Policy 
costings often  form part of  this analysis, and by  their nature, costings are an 
estimate  at  a  point  in  time  that  can  be  sensitive  to  variables  such  as 
assumptions, data quality, behavioural impacts, and dates of implementation. 
An  important point  of  consideration  for  the  Joint  Select Committee was  the 
consistency of PBO, Treasury and Finance costings. In this context, the ANAO 
observed  that  the PBO  actively  seeks  to  align  its  costing methodologies  and 
data with  these departments  through  regular updates of  costing models and 
                                                     
14  Section 64V (3) of the Parliamentary Service Act states that the PBO is not prevented from disclosing 
information related to a request for the purpose of complying with the request. 
15  In a United Kingdom study of pre-election costing processes in Australia and Ireland, confidentiality was 
seen as critical in encouraging parties to become more transparent about policy costs, as parties must 
be confident that details will not be leaked until they are ready to release the information. Institute for 
Government, Pre-election Policy Costing Mechanisms in Australia, Whitehall in year Five of the 
Coalition: Lessons from Elsewhere, 19 March 2014, United Kingdom, pp. 16–17. 
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data  sets.  The  PBO  also  includes  a  reliability  rating  in  all  costings,  as  an 
assessment of the risk that the actual costs will differ from those calculated.16 
26. The PBO’s early administrative arrangements included developing and 
implementing processes  to work with agencies  to obtain  information, and  to 
prepare  policy  costings  outside  of  and  during  caretaker  periods.  On 
28 August 2012, guidance on  the PBO’s policy  costing  function was  released, 
with  the  PBO  accepting  requests  from  this  date.  In  this  context,  from 
September 2012  to  April 2014,  there  have  been  1101 requests  for  costings  or 
information17  made  by  parliamentarians,  and  the  PBO  has  completed 
969 requests  (103  of  those  requests  were  withdrawn,  leaving  29 requests 




27. During  a  Senate  Finance  and  Public  Administration  Legislation 
Committee  hearing  in  February 2013,  the  Parliamentary  Budget  Officer 
reported  that  he  was  encouraging  parliamentarians  to  submit  any  policy 
costing  requests  well  in  advance  of  the  caretaker  period.18  The  ANAO’s 
analysis of the PBO’s costing data shows there was a peak of 326 costings and 
requests  for  information  prior  to  the  caretaker  period.  All  of  these  were 
completed by polling day. Many of  these  requests were updates  to previous 
costings, and this enabled the PBO to more rapidly complete them during the 
caretaker period. If the PBO had been faced with a significant number of new 
costing  requests  during  the  caretaker  period,  for  which  it  had  no  costing 
models or data,  the  same outcome would have been very challenging,  if not 
impossible,  to  achieve.  The  inclusion  of  the  PBO,  along  with  Treasury  and 
Finance, in providing costings during the caretaker period also influenced the 
balance  of  departmental  workloads  in  relation  to  formal  requests.  For  the 
2010 election,  Finance  prepared  129 of  the  144 total  costings  and  Treasury 
                                                     
16  The PBO’s costing reliability indicators are based on an assessment of the quality of data sources and 
the predictability of the behaviour of the party to which the policy will apply. These correspond to the 
ratings used by Treasury in the 2012 Tax Expenditures Statement. At the time of preparing this report, 
the PBO was reviewing its reliability ratings. 
17  The PBO’s data from July 2012 to September 2013 records requests, and does not differentiate 
between a costing request or an information request from a parliamentarian (that is, a request other 
than a costing request). 
18  The PBO could more readily update the costing with the latest budget report (the Pre-election Economic 
and Fiscal Outlook) if the PBO had costed that policy previously, and would likely have the models and 
much of the data needed. 
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prepared  15.  In  2013, Finance prepared  76 costings, Treasury prepared  three 
costings and the PBO prepared 85 costings.19  
28. The ANAO’s  analysis  of  PBO data  also  shows  broad  uptake  of  PBO 
services  by  parliamentarians,  with  the  Coalition  and  the  Australian  Greens 
making  the  most  requests  in  the  lead  up  to  the  election  (500 requests  and 
404 requests  respectively  outside  of  the  caretaker  period).  There  were  also 
12 requests  made  by  individual  parliamentarians  (independent  member  or 
private members) for the same period.20 
29. The  PBO  follows  the  Charter  of  Budget  Honesty  Policy  Costing 
Guidelines (Charter Guidelines) when preparing a costing.21 These specify the 
inclusion  of  agency  administrative  expenses  where  requested  and  feasible, 
although  the  PBO  advised  the ANAO  that  it makes  a  judgement  about  the 
inclusion of administrative expenses  for each policy. This assessment  focuses 
on whether or not  those  costs are  significant  in  the  context of  implementing 
that specific policy, and not on whether the agency is able to absorb those costs 
within its existing budget. If administrative expenses are not considered to be 
significant  in  relation  to  the  implementation of  that policy,  they may not be 
included, or be assumed to be covered by existing agency resourcing. The PBO 
also  advised  that  an  exception  to  this  approach  would  be  where  the 
specification that costs are to be absorbed by the agency is made by the party 
holding  government  (as  occurred  for  some  costings  prepared  for  the  2013 
Post‐Election Report). For some confidential costings, the PBO may not be able 
to discuss  any  aspect of  these  expenses with  the  agency. However,  the PBO 
advised that it does consult with agencies particularly where it considers that a 
proposal  includes significant  IT costs. Results of  the ANAO’s examination of 
126 PBO  costings  prepared  outside  the  caretaker  period22  showed  that  in 
27 per cent  of  the  sample  (34  of  the  126  requests)  the  PBO’s  treatment  of 
                                                     
19  This comparison needs to be read with some caution, as prior to the caretaker period the Government 
may seek costings and advice from these agencies at any time. 
20  The ANAO’s feedback from parliamentarians identified that independents may increase their usage of 
the PBO in the future, as agreements with the former government gave them access to more resources 
at that time. 
21  The Parliamentary Service Act requires the PBO to follow the Charter Guidelines if the Parliamentary 
Budget Officer has not issued his/her own written principles. At the time of preparing this report, the 
Parliamentary Budget Officer had not issued his own costing principles. 
22  The 126 costings were part of a larger indicative sample of 240 costings examined by the ANAO. 
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administrative  expenses differed  from  the  request made  (either  including or 
excluding these expenses).23 
30. The ANAO has commented  in various reports about the challenges to 
policy  implementation  that  agencies  face,  and  that  a  government’s  policy 
















analysis, and providing policy advice could bring  the PBO’s  impartiality  into 
question. However, the PBO does meet with requestors to clarify aspects of the 
policy,  or  seek  additional  information  to  complete  the  costing.25  The  PBO’s 
practice has been to prepare costings on the basis of the parameters provided 
by  the  requestor,  and  not  to provide  advice  and  feedback  on  the merits,  or 
feasibility, of the policy or its parameters. In practice, where some caution has 
been  required  the PBO has added a  caveat. For  example,  in  the  costing of a 
major  savings  initiative  (the  Coalition‘s  election  policy  Reduce  Public  Service 
                                                     
23  Agencies consulted by the ANAO raised issues in relation to the apparent non-inclusion of 
administrative expenses, such as for systems development or tender processes, in some policy 
costings. The ANAO’s analysis of the 92 costings that had documentation included in the PBO’s 
Post-Election Report of Election Commitments, showed that 43 had agency administrative expenses 
included, 26 did not, and 23 could not be assessed (due to there being no mention of the expenses, the 
policy being for the termination of a program, or the explanation was unclear). 
24  For example: ANAO, Audit Report No.9 2010–11, Green Loans Program; and Audit Report No.12 
2010–11, Home Insulation Program. 
25  Due to time constraints during the caretaker period, the PBO advised the ANAO that it had greater 
flexibility outside of the caretaker period to meet with requestors.  
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headcount  by  12,000  through  natural  attrition)  the  PBO  included  the  following 
caveat: 
A  tight  constraint  on  both  the  engagement  of  new  ongoing  staff  and 
re‐engagement  of  non‐ongoing  staff  will  be  required  for  this  policy  to  be 








policy  costings  during  the  2013 caretaker  period.  The  Charter  of  Budget 
Honesty  specifies  that  requests  for  policy  costings made  before  polling  day 
during the caretaker period for a general election must be made public as soon 
as possible.27 In 2013, the Government’s Economic Statement28 was released on 
2 August 2013,  two  days  before  the  start  of  the  caretaker  period  on 
5 August 2013. As  the Coalition’s policies had been previously  costed by  the 
PBO  in  the  lead  up  to  the  election,  the  Coalition  was  able  to  resubmit  its 
costings to be updated for the new economic statement in this two day period. 
The public  release provision of  the Charter of Budget Honesty did  therefore 
not apply to the Coalition’s election policies and the Coalition chose to release 
the  costings  just prior  to polling day. This  tactical decision had  the  effect of 
reducing the time available for scrutiny of the costs of the Coalition’s election 
platform. Such an approach was consistent with the provisions of the Charter 
of  Budget  Honesty,  and  the  Parliamentary  Service  Act.  Nevertheless,  some 
stakeholders  commented  that  this  ran  counter  to  the  trend  for  greater 
transparency that had been fostered by the establishment of the PBO. 
34. The  ANAO  compared  the  costings  for  the  election  commitments  of 
incoming  governments  for  the  2007,  2010  and  2013  elections  with  the 
corresponding Budget papers. While  a  smaller proportion  of policy  costings 
                                                     
26  PBO, Post-election report of election commitments—2013 general election, Commonwealth of Australia, 
18 October 2013, p. 198. 
27  Clause 31(1) of the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998. 
28  The Economic Statement is a budget document that provides an update of the Government’s economic 
forecasts and key fiscal aggregates. 
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and  2010).  The  range  of  variances  was  also  lower  for  2013  (between 
2 to 261 per cent  in  2013  compared  with  1  to  536 per cent  in  2007).  These 
figures would suggest that policies costed during the 2013 election period were 
more  comparable  with  Budget  figures  than  the  previous  election  period 
costings.  That  said,  care  needs  to  be  taken  in  making  this  comparison,  as 
differences  between  governments,  and  a  range  of  costing  variables  (such  as 
assumptions, data quality, behavioural impacts, and dates of implementation) 
will affect  the  final policies  (and  their  costs)  that went  forward  to  respective 




The Post-Election Report of Election Commitments and other functions 
35. In  addition  to  its  costing of  individual policy measures,  the PBO has 
also contributed to improving the transparency of budgetary and fiscal matters 
through  its  Post‐Election  Report  of  Election  Commitments  (Post‐Election 
Report);  and  by  publishing  self‐initiated  research.  The  Post‐Election  Report 
was  a  major  achievement  and  the  first  time  the  effect  of  all  major  parties’ 
election  platforms  on  the  budget  had  been  publicly  released.  Peer  group 
stakeholders  interviewed  by  the  ANAO  were  generally  positive  about  the 
report  in  providing  transparency  around  election  commitments,  but 
commented that the report had little publicity and this could have reduced the 
report’s impact. 
36. Parliamentarians also considered  the report  to be an achievement, but 
feedback to the ANAO on the process was mixed. One political party reported 
satisfaction  with  the  process,  but  another  party  reported  concern  at  the 
compressed preparation  time  (the  report has  to be  released 30 days after  the 
end of the caretaker period), and also the extensive detail that was given in the 
report to costing assumptions for individual policies. 
37. The  PBO  has  also  released  three  research  papers,  covering  the 
structural budget balance, historic government spending trends, and trends in 
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interviewed  by  the  ANAO  agreed  that  the  PBO’s  work  facilitated  a  more 
informed public debate,  and  there  is  the potential  for  this  to  increase  as  the 
PBO  releases  further  information  and  the  public  becomes  better  educated 





the  Parliament  with  independent  and  non‐partisan  analysis  of  the  budget 
cycle,  fiscal  policy  and  the  financial  implications  of  proposals,  the  PBO  has 
been effectively established and performed  its role creditably, as  indicated  in 
paragraph  16  above.  In  performing  this  role,  the  PBO  has  received  good 
cooperation from the Treasury, Finance and other Commonwealth agencies. 
39. The  ANAO  has  made  one  recommendation  to  improve  the 
transparency  of  agency  administrative  expenses, where  applicable,  in  policy 
costings  as  part  of  the  full  costs  of  implementing  policy  proposals.  The 
approach  taken by  the PBO  to  include  agency  administrative  expenses  on  a 
case  by  case  basis  when  policies  are  costed,  raises  the  question  about  the 
completeness  of  the  information  available  to  the  requestor.  Including  these 
administrative  expenses  in  all  costings  (where  significant  to  the 
implementation  of  the  policy)  would  fairly  present  the  full  cost  of 
implementing a proposal, and its administrative and program components, to 
the parliamentarian who made the request.  
40. The  ANAO  has  also  identified  a  limited  number  of  administrative 
improvements  for  the  PBO  to  consider  going  forward,  including:  providing 
sufficient context in relation to each information request to position agencies to 
provide  the  most  appropriate  information  in  response.30  Additionally,  the 
audit  highlighted  issues  of  a  policy  nature  that  may  warrant  further 
consideration:  
                                                     
29  The PBO paper on Trends in Australian Government receipts: 1982–83 to 2012–13 was released on 
15 April 2014, after the ANAO’s interviews with stakeholders. 
30  The concluding comments of Chapters 2 to 5 of this report contain further suggestions such as: 
finalising governance documentation and reviewing key performance indicators to better demonstrate 
the PBO’s effectiveness; seeking formal feedback from agencies about the process for requesting 
information; and documentation of quality control decisions. 
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 to date  the PBO  has  generally  been  able  to  access  the  information  it 
needs without  statutory  information  access powers. However,  one  of 




In  this  context,  the  issue  of  the  lack  of  access  by  the  PBO  to  the 
composition  of  the  Budget’s  Contingency  Reserve  on  public  interest 
grounds could also be considered;  
 Australia’s  PBO  has  nearly  two  years’  experience,  and  since  its 
establishment there are now evolving international perspectives on the 
mandates  and  functions  of  IFIs.32  The  Government’s  National 
Commission of Audit has also recommended an additional function for 
the  PBO—reporting  the Government’s  progress  against  a  new  set  of 
fiscal  rules33—and  this would  be  consistent with  one  of  the  four  key 
features of effective IFIs  identified by  the IMF, and with  the  functions 
performed by 11 of the 17 OECD countries’ IFIs.  





31  OECD, OECD Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions, Working party for Senior Budget Officials, 
OECD Network of Parliamentary Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions, 
12 February 2013, p. 7. 
32  For example, information contained in: OECD, OECD Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions, 
Working party for Senior Budget Officials, OECD Network of Parliamentary Budget Officials and 
Independent Fiscal Institutions, 12 February 2013; OECD, Independent Fiscal Institutions in 
Government at a Glance 2013, OECD Publishing, p. 99; and IMF, The Functions and Impacts of Fiscal 
Councils, 16 July 2013. 
33  The issue of whether the PBO should be given statutory information access powers (mentioned above) 
is also relevant to this proposal. 
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31  OECD, OECD Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions, Working party for Senior Budget Officials, 
OECD Network of Parliamentary Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions, 
12 February 2013, p. 7. 
32  For example, information contained in: OECD, OECD Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions, 
Working party for Senior Budget Officials, OECD Network of Parliamentary Budget Officials and 
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Summary of responses to the proposed report 
42. The  Parliamentary  Budget  Officer  provided  the  following  response, 
with the formal response at Appendix 1: 
On  behalf  of  the  management  and  staff  of  the  PBO  I  wish  to  record  our 
appreciation  of  the  cooperative  and  thoughtful  approach  adopted  by  your 
officers in conducting the first performance audit of the PBO.  
The  comprehensive nature of  the  audit  and  the  thoroughness with which  it 
was  undertaken  provide  me  with  a  high  level  of  assurance  that  our 
governance  arrangements  and  processes  are  sound  and  that  the  PBO  is 
meeting  its  obligations  to  the  Australian  Parliament.  I  appreciate  the 
constructive  suggestions  in  the  report  for  further  improving  the  PBO’s 
processes. 
I  agree  with  the  recommendation  that  the  PBO  include  in  all  costings, 
estimates  of  administrative  expenses,  where  significant.  This  will  improve 
transparency by  separately  identifying  significant administrative expenses  in 
costings  of  policies  that  are  specified  as  capped  amounts. This  is  consistent 
with  the  approach  that  we  take  to  separately  identifying  significant 
administrative expenses in costings of other policies. 
43. The  ANAO  also  provided  an  extract  of  the  report  to  Treasury  and 
Finance.  Neither  of  those  agencies  had  comments  on  the  extract  provided. 
Their responses are also included at Appendix 1. 
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1. Background and Context 
This chapter provides the background and context for the audit, including an overview 




to examine  the adequacy of  fiscal management, government  forecasting, and 





research  and  analytical  offices—collectively  known  as  Independent  Fiscal 
Institutions  (IFIs)—being  established  with  varying  mandates,  functions  and 
authority. Within this context, the OECD stated:  
... governments, regional and international bodies, and academics [are] looking 
to  IFIs  (often  in  concert with new or  strengthened  fiscal  rules)  to  strengthen 
fiscal governance and  to combat deficits and unsustainable debts. Moreover, 
these  actors  recognise  the  potential  of  IFIs  to  reduce  informational 
asymmetries, educate the public, and raise the quality of public debate.35 
Australia’s  Parliamentary  Budget  Office  (PBO),  which  began  operation  in 
July 2012, is one of 10 such offices established in OECD countries since 2007. 
                                                     
34  Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office, Inquiry into the Proposed Parliamentary 
Budget Office, March 2011, p. 7. 
35  OECD, OECD Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions, Working party for Senior Budget Officials, 
OECD Network of Parliamentary Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions, 
12 February 2013, p. 3. 
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Background to the establishment of Australia’s 




 2005,  the  former  Manager  of  Opposition  Business  asked  the  former 
Speaker  of  the  House  to  consider  ‘how  much  more  effective  and 
accountable  governments  in Australia  could  be  if we  had  something 
like  [the  United  States  of  America’s]  Congressional  Budget  Office 
charged  with  providing  budget  and  economic  projections  in  an 
independent way that all members of parliament could access’37; 
 2009,  the  former  Leader  of  the  Opposition  advocated  for  the 
establishment of a PBO, envisaging that a parliamentary budget office 





1.3 Following  the  August  2010  Federal  Election  and  as  part  of  the 
formation  of  the  then  minority  Government,  agreements  were  reached 
between  the  Australian  Labor  Party,  three  independent  Members40  and  the 
Australian Greens. These agreements encompassed a broad range of matters to 




36  The report of the Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office, Inquiry into the Proposed 
Parliamentary Budget Office, March 2011, pp. 1–2, contains further examples. 
37  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates—Parliamentary Service Amendment Bill Second Reading 
Speech, House of Representatives, 16 March 2005, J Gillard MP, p. 57. 
38  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates—Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 2009–2010, Second Reading 
Speech, House of Representatives, 14 May 2009, M Turnbull MP, p. 3975. 
39  T Abbott MP, Real Action to End the Waste & Deliver Lower, Fairer and Simpler Taxes, 
12 August 2010, available at 
<http://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2010/08/12/real-action-end-waste-and-deliver-lower-fairer-and-si
mpler-taxes-0> [accessed 11 November 2013]. 
40  R Oakshott MP, T Windsor MP and A Wilkie MP. 
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36  The report of the Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office, Inquiry into the Proposed 
Parliamentary Budget Office, March 2011, pp. 1–2, contains further examples. 
37  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates—Parliamentary Service Amendment Bill Second Reading 
Speech, House of Representatives, 16 March 2005, J Gillard MP, p. 57. 
38  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates—Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 2009–2010, Second Reading 
Speech, House of Representatives, 14 May 2009, M Turnbull MP, p. 3975. 
39  T Abbott MP, Real Action to End the Waste & Deliver Lower, Fairer and Simpler Taxes, 
12 August 2010, available at 
<http://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2010/08/12/real-action-end-waste-and-deliver-lower-fairer-and-si
mpler-taxes-0> [accessed 11 November 2013]. 
40  R Oakshott MP, T Windsor MP and A Wilkie MP. 
Background and Context 
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A  Parliamentary  Budget  Office  be  established,  based  in  the  Parliamentary 
Library,  to  provide  independent  costings,  fiscal  analysis  and  research  to  all 
members of parliament,  especially non‐government members. The  structure, 
resourcing and protocols  for such an Office be  the subject of a decision by a 
special  committee  of  the  Parliament  which  is  truly  representative  of  the 
Parliament.41 
Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office 
1.4 In  November  2010,  the  Joint  Select  Committee  on  the  Parliamentary 
Budget Office  (the  Joint Select Committee) was  established. The  committee’s 
terms of reference were to report on: the appropriate mandate for the PBO; the 
nature  of  the  information  needed  by  parliament;  the  role  and  adequacy  of 
current  institutions  in  providing  this  information;  the  scope  for  the  PBO  to 
fulfil  its  mandate  in  a  cost‐effective  manner;  and  the  most  appropriate 
structure, resourcing and protocols for the PBO.  
1.5 The committee also considered the operation of similar offices in other 
jurisdictions,  and  the  contribution  of  the  Departments  of  the  Treasury 
(Treasury)  and  Finance  and  Deregulation42  (Finance)  in  undertaking  policy 
costings through the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (the Charter of Budget 
Honesty).  
The Charter of Budget Honesty provides a framework for the conduct of government 
fiscal policy, and among other things, requires the Government to table in Parliament 
regular fiscal reports (such as an economic and fiscal outlook with each budget, a 
mid-year economic and fiscal outlook, and a tax expenditure statement). The Charter 
of Budget Honesty also sets out the arrangements for election policy costings to be 
prepared by Treasury or Finance during the caretaker period43 for Federal elections. 
1.6 The  committee  received  25  submissions  and  one  exhibit,  held  three 
public hearings, and  its  report was  tabled on 23 March 2011. Submissions  to 
the committee were varied, with some of  the key discussion points revolving 
around  the  roles  and  functions  of  existing  IFIs. Respondents  also  raised  the 
cost‐effectiveness of duplicating the work of already existing services, the role 
                                                     
41  House of Representatives, Agreement for a Better Parliament, tabled paper, 20 October 2010, p. 8. The 
PBO was subsequently established as an independent entity, rather than as part of the Parliamentary 
Library. 
42  The Department of Finance and Deregulation is now known as the Department of Finance. 
43  The caretaker period is the period preceding an election for the House of Representatives. It begins at 
the time the House of Representatives is dissolved and continues until the election result is clear or, if 
there is a change of government, until the new government is appointed. 
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and  function  of  the  PBO  and  how  it  would  collect  information  from  the 
Government. 
1.7 The  committee’s  report  made  28  recommendations,  with  three 
underpinning values of: incorporating mechanisms for the PBO to enhance the 
transparency  of  process;  ensuring  equality  of  access  to  its  services;  and 







election  costings,  new  measures  to  provide  incentives  for  political 
parties  to use  the process  to enhance  transparency and accountability, 
and  to  enable  minor  parties  to  access  the  existing  elections  costing 
process, among other changes (Recommendations 4–9); and 
 the PBO accessing information from government departments through 
a  negotiated  Memorandum  of  Understanding  with  Treasury  and 
Finance  and  other  departments  or  organisations  as  necessary 
(Recommendation 13). 
Passage of the legislation 
1.8 Members  of  the  bi‐partisan  committee  agreed  with  the  report 
unanimously and, after the Government’s response to the report was tabled in 
the  Parliament,  funding  for  the  PBO  was  provided  in  the  2011–12  Budget 
($24.9 million over four years). In August 2011, the Second Reading Speech to 
the  Parliamentary  Service  Amendment  (Parliamentary  Budget  Officer)  Bill 
2011 described the PBO as an: 
... important new institution that will further strengthen Australia’s fiscal and 
budget  frameworks.  It will  bring  greater  accountability  and  transparency  to 
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... important new institution that will further strengthen Australia’s fiscal and 
budget  frameworks.  It will  bring  greater  accountability  and  transparency  to 
policy  costings  processes,  particularly  during  election  periods.  And  it  will 
ensure that no party or member of parliament will have an excuse to avoid the 
scrutiny of its policy costings. It will ensure that the Australian public can be 
Background and Context 
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better  informed  about  the  costs of  election policy proposals before  they  cast 
their vote at the election.44 
1.9 Nonetheless,  there were differences of view over  the Bill as  it passed 
through both houses of Parliament. Some of the concerns raised were: the need 
for  the PBO  to have statutory  information gathering powers;  the  inclusion of 
the PBO with Treasury and Finance in preparing caretaker policy costings; the 
PBO  only  being  allowed  to use  official  economic  and  budget  forecasts  from 
Treasury and its inability to use other independent economic information; and 
the  inability  of  the  PBO  to  prepare  its  own  economic  forecasts  and  budget 
estimates.45  
1.10 The Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Officer) 
Bill  2011 was  introduced  into Parliament  on  24 August  2011  and passed  by 





purpose and  functions, access  to  information, oversight arrangements 
and the position of the Parliamentary Budget Officer; 
 Charter  of Budget Honesty,  by  amending  the definition  of  ‘caretaker 
period’  consistent  with  the  definition  in  the  Guidance  on  Caretaker 
Conventions  and  by  clarifying  the  processes  associated  with  the 
provision of policy  costings during a  caretaker period  (encompassing 





44  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Service Amendment 
(Parliamentary Budget Officer) Bill 2011, Second reading, 24 August 2011, W Swan MP, p. 9142. 
45  For example: on 22 August 2011 (two days before the introduction of the Government’s PBO Bill on 
24 August 2014), a private members bill was submitted to the House of Representatives for an 
alternative PBO to that proposed by the committee and agreed by government. Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 August 2011, J Hockey MP, pp. 8722–8723. 
46  The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet issues Guidance on Caretaker Conventions to guide 
Ministers and their departments while the caretaker period is in place.  
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prepared  by  the  PBO  that  relate  to  confidential  requests  cannot  be 
accessed under that Act.47 
Table 1.1 outlines the key events in the establishment of the PBO. 
Table 1.1: Key events in the establishment of the PBO 
Date Event 
20 October 2010 Agreement for a Better Parliament made 
22 November 2010 Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office formed 
23 March 2011 Joint Select Committee report is tabled 
1 August 2011 Government responds to Joint Select Committee recommendations 
24 August 2011 PBO Bill introduced into Parliament 
23 November 2011 PBO Bill passed by both Houses 
23 July 2012 PBO began operation 
Source: ANAO analysis. 
The purpose and functions of the Parliamentary Budget 
Office 
1.11 Prior  to  the establishment of  the PBO  there was no  independent body 
in Australia  that  specialised  in  research  and  analysis  of  fiscal policy  for  the 
Federal Parliament. While Treasury and Finance have  joint  responsibility  for 
providing  advice  to  the  Government;  resources  for  use  by  non‐government 
parliamentary parties,  individual and  independent Senators and Members of 
Parliament were largely limited to the Parliamentary Library. This support was 
not  ideal,  as  indicated  by  submissions  to  the  Joint  Select Committee  on  the 
Parliamentary Budget Office which stated that: 
 the  Parliamentary  Library  had  only  a  small  number  of  resources 
available, and regularly received feedback that Senators and Members 
did not  receive  sufficient  independent analysis and advice on budget 
and expenditure issues48; and 
                                                     
47  Amendments were also made to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 and the Long Service Leave 
(Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976 to encompass the position of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. 
48  Office of the Parliamentary Librarian, Submission to the inquiry into the Parliamentary Budget Office 
from the Parliamentary Librarian, p. 3. 
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The purpose of the PBO 
1.13 The PS Act sets out the purpose of the PBO: to inform the Parliament by 




1.14 In  May  2012,  the  Joint  Committee  of  Public  Accounts  and  Audit 
(JCPAA)  announced  the  appointment  of  the  Parliamentary  Budget  Officer, 
stating: 
The  PBO will  improve  the  transparency  of Australia’s  fiscal  and  budgetary 
frameworks,  and  help  level  the  playing  field  by  giving  all  Senators  and 
Members  access  to  independent  policy  costings  and  additional  support  to 
scrutinise the Budget.54  
1.15 The Parliamentary Budget Officer has described the PBO’s mandate as 
being  of  two  parts:  firstly,  to  support  the  Parliament  in  a  range  of 
budget‐related  matters;  and  secondly,  to  help  inform  the  public  debate  on 
budgetary and fiscal policy issues.55 
                                                     
49  Joint Standing Committee on the Parliamentary Library, Submission to the inquiry into the Parliamentary 
Budget Office, p. 7. 
50  The inaugural Parliamentary Budget Officer, Mr Phil Bowen PSM FCPA, took office on 23 July 2012 for 
a term of four years. The PBO commenced operations from that date. 
51  The other three parliamentary departments are the Departments of: Parliamentary Services; the House 
of Representatives; and the Senate. 
52  Funding also available for this period was $1.8 million from the prior year, and a special appropriation of 
$6 million. 
53  Section 64B of the Parliamentary Service Act 1999. 
54  JCPAA, Appointment of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Media Alert, 20 May 2012. 
55  P Bowen, Parliamentary Budget Officer, Maintaining a Focus on Fiscal Discipline and Budget 
Transparency—the Role of the Parliamentary Budget Office, Address to the Carnegie Mellon Forum, 
Adelaide, 29 November 2013, p. 2. 
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The functions of the PBO 
1.16 The  PS  Act  gives  the  Parliamentary  Budget  Officer  the  following 
six functions: 
 outside  the  caretaker  period  for  a  general  election,  to  prepare  policy 








 after  a  general  election,  to  report  on  election  commitments  of 
designated parliamentary parties56; and 
 to  conduct  self‐initiated  research  on  the  budget  and  fiscal  policy 
settings.  
1.17 The  Act  also  specifies  the  administrative  arrangements  for  the 
collection  of  information,  establishment  of  costing  conventions,  reporting 
confidentiality and oversight. The JCPAA  is the PBO’s oversight body, and  is 
responsible  for:  approving  the  appointment  of  the  Parliamentary  Budget 
Officer; considering the operations and resources of the PBO; and reporting to 
Parliament on matters relating to the PBO. 
Information collection arrangements 
1.18 The  PS  Act  enables  the  Parliamentary  Budget  Officer  to  obtain 
information  from Commonwealth  bodies  relevant  to  the Officer’s  functions. 




information  and  documents  (the MoU). Treasury  and  Finance  have  the  closest 
                                                     
56  In June 2013, the Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Officer) Act 2013 
expanded the PBO’s mandate to include the requirement for reporting on the election commitments of 
designated parliamentary parties.  
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working relationship with  the PBO and  this  is guided by  the Protocols, MoU 
and the Charter of Budget Honesty.  
Independent Fiscal Institutions internationally 
1.19 According  to  the  IMF,  in  January  2013  there  were  29 IFIs  and  the 
mandate, budget,  and  resources of  each  institution varied depending on  the 
context of its establishment. In July 2013, the IMF released a paper identifying 
the  operational  features  to  design  and  implement  an  effective  IFI.  Four  key 
features of effective  IFIs were  identified, and  the  following  two apply  to  the 
Australian PBO model: 
 a strict operational independence from politics; and 
 a  strong  presence  in  the  public  debate  (notably  through  an  effective 
communication strategy).57 
1.20 There are 17 IFIs  in OECD member countries and,  in 2009,  the OECD 
formed a network  for parliamentary budget officials and  IFIs across member 
countries  (including Australia). Discussions  at  these network meetings  often 
focus on  the  institutional arrangements  for, practices of, and challenges faced 
by these institutions. Discussions have also recognised the growing complexity 
that  parliaments  face  in  their  oversight  role  when  scrutinising  economic 
assumptions, fiscal risks, and long‐term fiscal sustainability. 
1.21 There  are  some  key  differences  between  the  IFIs  of  OECD  member 
countries: only two have no role in macroeconomic forecasts (Australia and the 
Slovak Republic); six have no role in monitoring the government’s compliance 




1.22 In February 2014,  the OECD Council agreed  to a  set of principles  for 




57  The IMF uses the term ‘fiscal councils’. The other two key features of effective IFIs were the provision of 
public assessment of budgetary forecasts; and an explicit role in monitoring fiscal policy rules. IMF, The 
Functions and Impacts of Fiscal Councils, 16 July 2013, p. 8. See also paragraphs 1.25–1.26. 
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Table 1.2: Summary of OECD principles for Independent Fiscal 
Institutions 
Heading Principles 
Local ownership IFIs require broad national ownership, commitment and consensus 
across the political spectrum; and the local institutional environment 
should determine the role and structure of the IFI. 
Independence and 
non-partisanship 
IFIs should be independent and non-partisan; leadership selected on 
the basis of merit and competence; terms of length for leadership 
defined in legislation; position of head should be renumerated and 
full-time; IFI leadership should have the freedom to hire and dismiss 
staff; and staff should be selected according to a merit based process. 
Mandate The mandate of IFIs should be clearly defined in legislation; include the 
scope to produce reports and analysis at their own initiative; and the 
mandate should establish clear links to the budget process. 
Resources  The resources must be commensurate with the mandate in order for 
IFIs to fulfil their mandate in a credible manner. 
Relationship with 
the legislature 
There should be mechanisms for appropriate accountability to the 
legislature; and the role of the IFI and the legislature be clearly defined. 
Access to 
information 
Access to information should be guaranteed in legislation; and any 
restrictions to access should also be clearly defined in legislation. 
Transparency IFIs should apply full transparency to their work and operations; reports 
and analysis should be published and made freely available; release 
dates of major reports and analysis should be formally established; and 
IFIs should release their own reports and analysis. 
Communications Effective communication channels should be developed to influence 
fiscal policy making. 
External evaluation IFIs should develop a mechanism for external evaluation of their work. 
Source: ANAO summary of OECD, Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions in Recommendation of the 
Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions, 13 February 2014.  
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1.24 In  addition,  in  March  2014,  the  United  Kingdom’s  Institute  for 
Government  published  two  case  studies  on  pre‐election  policy  costing 
mechanisms in Ireland and Australia. The institute found that mechanisms for 
political  parties  to  cost  policies  in  non‐election  periods  could  improve  the 
quality of policies  and deliver more  informed public debate by  encouraging 
parties to be more open about the costs of their proposals.61 
1.25 On 22 October 2013, the Government announced the commencement of 
a  National  Commission  of  Audit.  Among  the  terms  of  reference  for  the 
Commission was: 
 identify  options  for  strengthening  Commonwealth  budgeting 





58  Parliament of Canada, Report on the Operations of the Parliamentary Budget Officer within the Library 
of Parliament, Standing Joint Committee on the Library of Parliament, June 2009. 
59  United Kingdom House of Commons Treasury Committee, Office for Budget Responsibility, 
September 2010. 
60  Parliament of New South Wales, Inquiry into the Parliamentary Budget Office, Joint Selection 
Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office, Report 1/55, December 2011. 
61  The Institute for Government describes itself as an independent charity with cross-party and Whitehall 
governance working to increase government effectiveness. United Kingdom Institute for Government, 
Pre-election policy costings—practical lessons from overseas, Blog, 19 March 2014, available at 
<http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/7376/pre-election-policy-costings-practical-lessons-from-
overseas/> [Accessed 31 March 2014]. 
62  Terms of Reference—National Commission of Audit, in: J Hockey MP and Senator M Cormann, 
Coalition Commences National Commission of Audit, Media Release, 22 October 2013. 
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1.26 The Commission’s  report was  publicly  released  on  1 May  2014.  The 
report contained a recommendation for the Government to adopt a high‐level 
fiscal  strategy  with  fiscal  rules  which  set  out  how  a  fiscal  strategy  will  be 
achieved  (Recommendation  1).  With  reference  to  the  PBO,  the  Commission 
recommended  that  the  PBO  reports  the  Government’s  progress  against  the 
fiscal  rules  following  the  release  of  the  Final  Budget  Outcome  each  year 
(Recommendation 2).  The  Government  has  not  yet  responded  to  these 
recommendations, however, the additional function for the PBO suggested  in 








 effective  governance  and  administrative  arrangements  were 
established, to support the delivery of services to the Parliament; 









1.30 This  audit  has  been  conducted  under  subsection  15(1)  of  the 
Auditor‐General Act 1997.63 In conducting this audit, the ANAO was mindful of 
the  Parliamentary  Service  Act,  which  allows  the  JCPAA  to  request  an 
independent review of the operations of the PBO, to be completed within nine 
                                                     
63  Under subsection 15(1) of the Auditor-General Act 1997, the Auditor-General may at any time conduct 
a performance audit of an Agency. 
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for  this  audit—its  objective,  criteria  and  expected  tabling  date  (planned  for 
completion  within  nine  months  of  the  general  election  held  on 
7 September 2013). 
Audit methodology  
1.31 The audit included the examination of documentation held by the PBO 
and the  information systems that support the PBO. Interviews were also held 
with  a wide  range  of  stakeholders  including:  officers  of  the  PBO,  Treasury, 
Finance, and Commonwealth agencies  that are signatories  to  the PBO’s MoU 
on  information  sharing;  representatives  of  parliamentary  parties  and 








Table 1.3: Report structure 
Chapter Chapter overview 
2. Establishment and 
Governance of the 
Parliamentary Budget 
Officer 
Examines the establishment of the PBO and the governance 
and administrative arrangements that support the PBO in 
providing its services to Parliament. Key issues arising during 
the establishment of the PBO are also discussed. 
3. Access to Information Examines the PBO’s approach to accessing information, and 
reports feedback from the Commonwealth agencies that 
provide much of this information to the PBO. 
4. Policy Costings Examines the PBO’s processes and performance in 
preparing policy costings outside and during the caretaker 
period and the quality of the PBO’s costings.  
5. The Post-Election Report 
and Other Functions 
Examines the PBO’s approach to preparing the Post-Election 
Report of Election Commitments, the self-initiated research 
prepared by the agency, and the PBO’s lessons learnt after 
the 2013 election. Stakeholders’ views about the PBO’s 
contribution to transparency of fiscal and budgetary 
frameworks are also discussed. 
Source: ANAO. 
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2. Establishment and Governance of 
the Parliamentary Budget Office 
This  chapter  examines  the  establishment  of  the  PBO  and  the  governance  and 





earlier.  Consequently,  the  PBO  had  a  limited  timeframe  to  implement 
governance, administrative arrangements, recruit staff, and develop processes 
and  procedures  in  order  to  be  able  to  undertake  its  mandated  functions, 
including requests for policy costings.  




Establishment of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
2.3 At  the  same  time  the  Parliamentary  Service  Amendment 
(Parliamentary  Budget  Officer)  Bill  2011  was  being  debated  in  Parliament 
(August to December 2011), the Government was deliberating on the details of 
how  the new PBO would operate. Given  their  joint role  in Charter of Budget 
Honesty matters, Treasury and Finance worked on operational arrangements 
relating  to  the  PBO,  particularly  the  PBO’s  access  to  information  from 





on  administrative matters  for  the  creation  of  the  PBO. On  19 April 2012,  an 
interim  executive  officer  was  seconded  from  Finance  to  the  Department  of 
Parliamentary  Services  to  assist  the working  group  by  undertaking  scoping 
and planning work. This  included providing advice on governance,  funding 
and  budget,  corporate  services,  human  resources,  accommodation  and 
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working  arrangements  with  Commonwealth  agencies.  On  23 July 2012,  this 
officer provided a brief  to  the newly appointed Parliamentary Budget Officer 
that outlined the major issues associated with the establishment of the PBO.  
2.5 The  development  of  an  implementation  plan,  incorporating  major 
activities and milestones, was mentioned in the brief. No implementation plan 
was  subsequently  developed,  but  many  elements  of  this  planning  already 
existed  in  the  brief  itself  (such  as  suggestions  for  immediate  priorities  and 
legislated  timeframes). Key  elements  of  implementation  planning were  then 
incorporated  into  the  PBO’s  first  annual  work  plan,  and  progress  was 
monitored in weekly executive meetings. 
2.6 The  Parliamentary  Budget  Officer  is  required  to  produce  an  annual 
work plan each financial year in consultation with the JCPAA.64 The PBO Work 
Plan 2012–13 was released on 12 October 2012, less than three months after the 
establishment  of  the PBO. The work plan  outlined  the  key priorities  for  the 
PBO in its first year of operations, including further arrangements needed for 
the  office.  Two  key  priorities  were  identified,  to:  make  the  PBO  fully 
operational with  the  capacity  to  fulfil  its mandate;  and gain  the  trust  of  the 
Parliament as a valued source of budget and fiscal policy analysis. Timeframes 
linked  to  legislated activities were also  identified,  for example,  the upcoming 





 establishing  financial  framework  elements  (consistent  with  Financial 
Management  and  Accountability  Act  1997  obligations),  and  an  interim 
shared  services  arrangement  with  the  Department  of  Parliamentary 
Services  for  corporate  services  such  as  finance,  human  resources, 
procurement and information technology services; 
 accepting  a  location  for  permanent  accommodation  in  Parliament 
House  (the PBO’s staff were  initially accommodated  in  three separate 
locations within Parliament House); 
                                                     
64  Section 64Q, Parliamentary Service Act 1999. 
65  Discussed in Chapter 5, the Post-Election Report had to be released 30 days after the end of the 
caretaker period for the 2013 election. 
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 consulting  key  parliamentary  stakeholders,  providing  guidance  to 
parliamentarians  on  the  policy  costings  function  on  28 August 2012, 
and accepting requests for policy costings from this date; and 




began  in  January 2013. The minutes of  these meetings appropriately  cover a 
variety of  topics,  including:  risk management, governance, human  resources, 
communications with APS agencies, and costing operations.  
2.9 The  brief, work  plan,  regular  executive meetings,  and  the  associated 
monitoring  of  priorities  provided  a  sound  basis  for  the  successful 
implementation of  the PBO,  especially given  its  small  size. While no official 
risk  management  strategy  existed  for  the  implementation,  the  PBO  advised 
that risks to successful implementation were examined (although not explicitly 
stated)  in  the  above  mentioned  documents  and  monitored  in  the  regular 
executive meetings.  
Governance arrangements 
2.10 The PBO’s organisational structure came  into effect  in December 2012, 
following  initial  recruitment  activities,  and  reflects  its  key  functions.  As  at 




arrangements with  the: Department  of  Parliamentary  Services  (DPS)  for  the 
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Figure 2.1: Structure of the PBO as at April 2014 
 
Source: PBO, Annual Report 2012–13, Canberra, 2013, p. 8; and information provided by the PBO. 
Note: The two graduate secondees are not reflected in this diagram. 
2.11 The PBO  is accountable to the Parliament for  its activities through the 
JCPAA  and  the  Senate  Finance  and  Public  Administration  Legislation 
Committee,  and  has  established  an  appropriate  governance  framework  to 
support its operations. 
Business planning 
2.12 As  discussed,  the  PS Act  requires  the  PBO,  in  consultation with  the 
JCPAA,  to prepare  an  annual work plan  by  1 October  each  year. This work 
plan  is publicly available and  identifies key priorities, how  the priorities will 




2.13 The  annual  work  plan  informs  the  divisional  work  plans  and  the 
Corporate Strategy Branch plan, which have also been produced  for 2012–13 
                                                     
66  The 2013–14 annual work plan was released on 18 December 2013, as the PBO was waiting for the 
formation of the JCPAA after the 2013 election. 
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lower‐level  plan.  These  divisional  work  plans  build  on  previous  plans,  are 
time‐specific,  identify  a  range  of  goals  and  allocate  the  resources  to  achieve 
them.  
Risk management 
2.14 The  PBO’s  risk management  framework was  finalised  in April  2014, 
with the first risk register scheduled for completion by mid‐2014. The PBO has, 
however, had two processes in place to manage risks in the interim: the weekly 
executive meeting; and  the PBO Audit Committee. The PBO advised  that  the 
weekly  executive  meetings  enable  the  executive  to  promptly  identify  and 
monitor business risks and respond with appropriate mitigation strategies. 
2.15 The PBO Audit Committee first met in July 2013 and its sole objective is 
to  provide  independent  assurance  and  advice  to  the  Parliamentary  Budget 




 reputation  damage:  from  any  adverse  impact  arising  from  real  or 






fraud among PBO staff and provide a  fraud control  framework. A  fraud risk 
assessment  and  a Business Continuity Plan  are  scheduled  for  completion  in 
mid‐2014. The PBO  advised  that  the  timing  for  completing  the  risk  register, 
fraud risk assessment and business continuity plan took into account the date 
when  the  PBO’s  new  protected  network  was  expected  to  be  in  place 
(December 2013).  
                                                     
67  Membership comprises two external appointees and the Assistant Parliamentary Budget Officer, 
Corporate Strategy Branch, with PBO secretariat staff and Chief Finance Officer, and representatives 
from the internal audit provider and the ANAO as observers. 
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Performance management and reporting 
2.17 The  Australian  Government’s  Outcomes  and  Programs  framework 
requires agencies  to publish  in  their PBS  their outcomes, program objectives, 
deliverables  and  key  performance  indicators  (KPIs)  for  each  program.  In 
2012–13, while  the PBO was  included  in  the PBS,  the objectives, deliverables 
and  KPIs  were  yet  to  be  developed,  awaiting  the  appointment  of  the 
Parliamentary Budget Officer. 
2.18 The PBO’s 2013–14 and 2014–15 PBS outcome and single objective were 
the  same:  to  inform  the  Parliament  by  providing  independent  and 
non‐partisan  analysis  of  the  budget  cycle,  fiscal  policy  and  the  financial 
implications of proposals. The PBO’s deliverables mirrored its functions at that 
time68,  but  excluded  preparing  submissions  to  parliamentary  inquiries  on 
request  and  included  a  statement  about  further  developing  the  PBO’s 
capabilities to better fulfil its mandate. Table 2.1 outlines the PBO’s KPIs. 
Table 2.1: PBO key performance indicators for 2013–14 and 2014–15 
2013–14. The PBO’s outputs are: high quality; timely; relevant; and useful to parliamentary 
stakeholders. Indicators of performance include: satisfaction from parliamentary stakeholders; 
and independent and transparent processes are followed. 
2014–15. The PBO’s performance will be judged by: 
 the relevance, quality and timeliness of its outputs, based on feedback from parliamentary 
stakeholders; 
 the independence, transparency and integrity of its processes; and 
 its overall performance since its establishment, based on the findings of an ANAO 
performance audit. 
Source: Australian Government, Portfolio Budget Statements 2013–14, Budget Related paper No. 1.19D, 
Parliamentary Budget Office, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 14; and 
 Australian Government, Portfolio Budget Statements 2014–15, Budget Related paper No. 1.17D, 
Parliamentary Budget Office, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 14. 
2.19 Agencies report against their PBS deliverables and KPIs in their annual 
reports.  The  PBO’s  2012–13  Annual  Report  contains  commentary  on  the 
activities undertaken in establishing the PBO (such as recruiting staff, engaging 
with  parliamentary  stakeholders,  and  developing  guidance  for  stakeholders 
and  staff), building  analytical  capability  in  financial modelling  and  costings, 
                                                     
68  As given by the PS Act and outlined in paragraph 1.16. In 2013–14, the Post-Election Report was not 
included, as this function was allocated to the PBO in June 2013. In the 2014–15 PBS, the 
Post-Election Report and caretaker costing functions were excluded, as these are only applicable during 
an election year. 
 
ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 
The Administration of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
 
52 






2.20 In September and October 2013,  the PBO also sought verbal  feedback 
from  the Coalition  and  the Australian Greens on  the quality,  timeliness  and 
relevance of its outputs. The Annual Report states that these stakeholders were 
very  satisfied  with  the  quality  and  relevance  of  outcomes,  particularly  the 
policy  costings  and  support  for  policy  development.  Stakeholders  were 
generally  satisfied with  timeliness,  but  expressed  concerns  about  delays  the 




reliable  and  complete.70  In  this  regard, neither  the deliverables nor  the KPIs 
contain  targets  or  service  standards  to measure  the  PBO’s  performance  and 
allow  a  comparison  over  time.71  The  PBO  already  reports  some  relevant 
performance  information—its  timeframes for responding  to parliamentarians’ 
requests—but a corresponding quantifiable standard is not incorporated in the 
KPIs.  The  PBO  also  currently  has  no  established  process  or  timeframe  for 
receiving  feedback  from  parliamentarians  (both  parliamentary  parties  and 
individuals). Given  that  this  feedback  forms  the basis of  the PBO’s  reporting 
against  its  KPIs,  there  would  be  merit  in  formalising  the  process  and 
developing  a  repeatable  survey  that  allows  consistent  assessment  of  results 
over time. Now that the PBO has almost completed two full years of operation, 
there  would  also  be  merit  in  reviewing  the  KPIs  to  better  demonstrate  the 
effectiveness of the PBO in performing all of its functions. 
                                                     
69  Results against these parameters are discussed in Chapter 3: Access to Information, and Chapter 4: 
Policy Costings, respectively. 
70  ANAO, Audit Report No.21 2013–14, Pilot Project to Audit Key Performance Indicators. 
71  Service standards that could have been relevant to 2013–14, include the suggested five business day 
completion of caretaker policy costings from the Charter Guidelines, and the requirement to release the 
Post-Election Report 30 days after the end of the caretaker period. 
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Internal management reporting 
2.22 Internally,  the  PBO’s  weekly  executive  meeting  has  broad 
responsibilities  to  monitor  the  strategic  direction  of  the  agency  and  other 
PBO‐wide management issues. This meeting is attended by the Parliamentary 
Budget  Officer  and  all  Senior  Executive  Service  staff.  These  meetings  are 
minuted,  and  the  minutes  demonstrate  a  focus  on  monitoring  the  PBO’s 
progress on  strategic  issues, as well as against costing  requests,  self‐initiated 
research, information requests to agencies, workforce planning, and corporate 
and financial items. 
Parliamentary Budget Office resourcing 
2.23 In  2011–12,  the Budget  allocation  for  the PBO was  $24.9 million  over 
four  years,  including  $0.5 million  to  provide  additional  costing  capability 




in  2013–14  provided  the  PBO  with  $4.5 million  over  five  years  to  enhance 
capability  and  functions,  and  to  produce  the  Post‐Election  Report  (also 
including $0.5 million for additional costing capability for the 2015–16 election 
period).  Table  2.2  summarises  the  PBO’s  budgeted  program  expenses  from 
2014–15 to 2017–18.  
Table 2.2: PBO budgeted program expenses for 2014–15 to 2017–18 
 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 
Budgeted program 
expenses ($m) 7.5 8.2 7.9 7.9 
Source: Australian Government, Portfolio Budget Statements 2014–15, Budget Related paper No. 1.17D, 
Parliamentary Budget Office, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 13. 
Human resource management 
2.24 The  PBO’s  2012–13  Annual  Report  stated  that  the  PBO  had  two 
competing priorities on commencement of operations: accepting requests from 
parliamentarians as quickly as possible; and putting  in place the capability to 
respond  to  these requests. This necessitated  the rapid recruitment of suitably 
qualified staff and the development of guidance material. 
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Recruitment and workforce planning 
2.25 In its report, the Joint Select Committee did not recommend a number 
of staff for the PBO but rather, the level of funding (no less than $6 million per 
annum  with  consideration  of  extra  resources  for  election  years).  The 
Parliamentary Budget Officer  is responsible for determining staffing numbers 
in line with allocated funding.  
2.26 Pending  the  recruitment  of permanent  employees,  in  September 2012 
the  PBO  seconded  10  temporary  employees  from  Australian  Public  Service 
agencies  (the  majority  from  Treasury  and  Finance).  Throughout  
2012–13,  priority  was  given  to  recruiting  permanent  staff.  This  was 
accomplished  through  two  bulk  recruitment  rounds  in  September 2012  and 
January 2013,  supplemented  by  targeted  recruiting  for  specific  positions. 
During  its peak work  load  and particularly  for  the  2013  election period,  the 
PBO also employed nine  contractors  (with  the average  contract  length being 
1.6 months).  
2.27 The  PBO’s  rapid  recruitment  of  staff  was  supported  by  workforce 
planning, with  recruitment  strategies documented  in  the PBO’s annual work 
plans  of  2012–13  and  2013–14,  and  the  divisional  work  plans  for  the  same 
years. The work plans track staffing resource levels and comment on whether 
they are sufficient for the current workload. The plans also provided details on 
the  PBO’s  approach  to  dealing  with  the  increased  workload  of  the 
2013 election. Pragmatic strategies were adopted and included: 
 flexibility  across  divisions,  with  Fiscal  Policy  Analysis  Division  staff 
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agencies  (the  majority  from  Treasury  and  Finance).  Throughout  
2012–13,  priority  was  given  to  recruiting  permanent  staff.  This  was 
accomplished  through  two  bulk  recruitment  rounds  in  September 2012  and 
January 2013,  supplemented  by  targeted  recruiting  for  specific  positions. 
During  its peak work  load  and particularly  for  the  2013  election period,  the 
PBO also employed nine  contractors  (with  the average  contract  length being 
1.6 months).  
2.27 The  PBO’s  rapid  recruitment  of  staff  was  supported  by  workforce 
planning, with  recruitment  strategies documented  in  the PBO’s annual work 
plans  of  2012–13  and  2013–14,  and  the  divisional  work  plans  for  the  same 
years. The work plans track staffing resource levels and comment on whether 
they are sufficient for the current workload. The plans also provided details on 
the  PBO’s  approach  to  dealing  with  the  increased  workload  of  the 
2013 election. Pragmatic strategies were adopted and included: 
 flexibility  across  divisions,  with  Fiscal  Policy  Analysis  Division  staff 
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2.28 The  PBO  monitors  a  range  of  staffing  statistics  and  information, 
including education, and previous employment history. This provides the PBO 
executive with  relevant  and  up‐to‐date  information  for workforce  planning, 
and also documents the broad academic and experience base of the PBO’s staff. 
Parliamentary and peer group stakeholders interviewed by the ANAO agreed 
that  PBO  staff  were  well  regarded,  professional,  and  had  the  necessary 
expertise for their roles.  
Guidance and training 
2.29 It  is  important  for staff of an agency, and especially a new agency,  to 
have  clearly  defined  roles  and  responsibilities  so  that  they  are  able  to  fulfil 
their specific roles. In April 2013, the PBO Operations Manual was developed 
for  staff  involved  in  policy  costing  processes,  and  has  become  the  key 
procedural guidance document  for all PBO staff. As well as comprehensively 
detailing  costings,  information  requests  and  records management  processes, 
the  manual  outlines  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  PBO,  the 
Parliamentary Budget Officer, and the Parliament in providing oversight to the 
operations  of  the PBO. The manual  is  considered  a  ‘living’ document,  to be 
updated progressively as PBO procedures develop over time.  
2.30 The roles and responsibilities of PBO staff are further defined in a PBO 
specific  performance  management  framework  which  has  clear  and  detailed 
work  level  standards  and  role  accountabilities  for  the  different  substantive 
roles within  the PBO. The  framework  is underpinned by a Code of Conduct 
which  explains how PBO  staff  should  act when  carrying out  their  roles  and 
responsibilities. 
2.31 Staff  receive  on‐the‐job  training  and  have  access  to  specific  PBO 
training  courses,  and  a  wide  range  of  courses  made  available  by  Treasury. 
In‐house  training  is  usually  specific  to  PBO  operations  and  includes,  for 
example,  training  on  specific  financial  or  economic  models  used  in  policy 
costings. Training provided by Treasury ranges from  introductory courses on 
different  tax  and  financial  arrangements  to  more  advanced  courses  on 
analysing  complex  data  sources.  The  PBO  advised  the ANAO  that  a  future 
training  calendar,  and  recording  and monitoring  system  for  staff who  have 
attended training, will be developed in 2014.    
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2.32 The  PBO  handles  confidential  data,  particularly  in  receiving  and 
responding to requests from parliamentarians, and information received from 
agencies.  As  a  small  agency,  the  PBO  relies  on  the  services  of  the  DPS  to 
provide and manage its IT systems, and has a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the DPS (DPS MoU) for the provision of these services. Prior to December 
2013,  the  PBO’s  IT  systems  were  based  on  an  unclassified  network,  and 
external  media  for  securely  storing  classified  data.  To  facilitate  access  to 
confidential  information  requested  from  and provided by  agencies,  the PBO 
used  a  joint  Treasury/Finance  protected  network  drive,  or  agencies  hand 




2.33 The management of  the PBO’s  confidential data  is dependent upon a 
secure IT environment. The Australian Government’s Protective Security Policy 
Framework  (PSPF)  requires  government  agencies  to  implement  policies  and 
procedures for the security classification and protective control of information 
which  match  their  value,  importance  and  sensitivity.72  The  underlying 
procedures  about  IT  security  are  provided  in  the  Australian  Government 
Information Security Manual (ISM), which sets out technical measures (controls) 
to protect information used, stored and transmitted by electronic means.73  
2.34 To  assess  the  PBO’s  IT  security  and  management  of  its  confidential 









72  Australian Government, Protective Security Policy Framework, INFOSEC 3, June 2013, p. 27. 
73  Prepared by the Australian Signals Directorate, and available from 
<http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/ism/index.htm>. 
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72  Australian Government, Protective Security Policy Framework, INFOSEC 3, June 2013, p. 27. 
73  Prepared by the Australian Signals Directorate, and available from 
<http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/ism/index.htm>. 
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Table 2.3: Summary assessment of the PBO’s IT governance 
arrangements  
Issue Relevance        Assessment and comment 
IT security 
framework 




    The PBO has a comprehensive security 
framework that includes an Information 
Communication and Technology Security 
Policy, a Security Risk Management Plan and 
a System Security Plan. 
However, the schedule to the DPS MoU 
reflecting the current level of IT services 
provided is not finalised. 
Management 
of the PBO’s 
data sets 
Data sets used by the 
PBO are appropriately 
updated, stored and 
access is controlled to 
safeguard the integrity 
and confidentiality of 
the data. 
    Data sets are appropriately managed, 
however the PBO is continuing to develop its 
data set management spreadsheet. 
 The level of user access to the data and 
model repository is appropriate for their roles, 
and the number of privileged user accounts 
are minimised. 
Access to the 
protected 
network 
Only authorised user 
accounts have access 






    The level of user access is appropriate for 
their roles, and the number of privileged user 
accounts are minimised. Password security 
meets the ISM requirements. 
 The monitoring of the activities of privileged 
users has not yet been conducted (scheduled 
to begin in June 2014). 




Only authorised user 
accounts have access 







 The level of user access is appropriate for 
their roles, the number of privileged user 
accounts are minimised, and the activities of 
privileged users are monitored.  
Access to the 
PBO twitter 
account 
Only authorised users 
can access and post 
twitter messages. 







and availability of the 
PBO’s data. 
 Backups are made based on DPS’s 
assessment of the PBO’s requirements. There 
is no finalised Business Continuity Plan to 
identify PBO’s business requirements. 
Legend:   : not adequate;   : generally satisfactory, with scope to improve;   : satisfactory 
Source: ANAO analysis of PBO data and controls. 
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2.35 At a governance  level,  the PBO has a  sound  security  framework and 
user  access  management  controls,  and  data  confidentiality  is  appropriately 
managed. However, at  the  time of writing  this  report, several  IT governance 
arrangements were yet to be finalised: 
 while  there  is  an  MoU  in  place  between  the  DPS  and  the  PBO,  the 
schedule  to  this MoU  reflecting  the  services provided  by  the DPS  in 
managing the protected network has been drafted but not finalised; 
 the  first  quarterly  assessment  of  activities  performed  by  privileged 
users on the network is due to be conducted in June 2014; and 
 the Business Continuity Plan,  scheduled  for  completion  in May 2014, 
does not currently  reflect  the  involvement  required  from DPS  staff  in 
relation to the protected network. The DPS is responsible for backups of 
the PBO’s data, in accordance with a draft policy prepared in June 2013 
on  behalf  of  the  PBO.  Incremental  backups  occur  daily  with  a  full 
backup weekly,  but without  a  finalised Business Continuity Plan  the 
PBO’s  specific  business  needs  have  not  been  identified.  The  PBO 
advised  that  the  finalised plan will document  the  involvement of DPS 
staff. 
The  PBO  advised  the  ANAO  that  finalisation  of  the  above‐mentioned 
arrangements was underway at the time of preparing this report.  
Key establishment issues for the Parliamentary Budget 
Office 






Liaison with parliamentarians 
2.37 The PBO actively engaged with parliamentary stakeholders early in its 
establishment, with  consultation occurring with key  stakeholders  in  the  first 
few weeks of operation. On 28 August 2012,  the  first  formal  communication 
from  the  PBO  to  parliamentarians  was  a  guidance  document  on  the  PBO’s 
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policy  costing  role.74  This  was  followed  by  a  House  briefing  on 
18 September 2012, to explain the role of the PBO and how to submit costings. 
The  PBO  has  continued  to  use  multiple  avenues  for  communication  with 
parliamentarians,  including  informal discussion, guidance documents, House 




had  no  criticism  of  the  PBO’s  guidance  material.  One  parliamentary 
stakeholder  said  the  requirements  for  submitting  requests  were  clearly 
outlined, and the costing request template provided a good framework. 
Liaison with Treasury and Finance 
2.38 Communication  between  the  PBO,  Treasury  and  Finance  occurred 
frequently  during  the  establishment  of  the  PBO,  at  both  the  executive  and 
working  levels. A high degree of cooperation was essential, so  that: working 
arrangements  with  the  PBO  were  clear  and  duplication  of  work  was 
minimised;  information held by Treasury  and Finance was  accessible by  the 
PBO;  and  costings  workload  during  the  2013  election  caretaker  period  was 
jointly planned for and coordinated. 
2.39 The  PBO,  Treasury  and  Finance  advised  the  ANAO  that  initially, 
meetings between the executive occurred quarterly, but at the time of writing 
this report, meetings were held as needed. These meetings were not minuted, 
but  all  three  departments  advised  that  the  meetings  were  collaborative.  Of 
particular  importance  for  the  PBO  was  access  to  Treasury’s  and  Finance’s 
information,  as  these  two departments  hold  the majority  of  the  information 
needed  by  the PBO  in  conducting  its  functions.76 Treasury  and  Finance  also 
have  a  role  ensuring  the  integrity  of  the Government’s official  estimates  are 
maintained (discussed in Chapter 3).  
                                                     
74  PBO, A Summary Guide to Policy Costings—procedures, information requirements and methodology, 
PBO Guidance 01/2012, 28 August 2012. 
75  Guidance to Senators and Members can be found at: <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/ 
Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/guidance> [Accessed 21 March 2014]. 
76  Discussed in Chapter 3, around 26 per cent of all requests for information from the PBO are to these 
two departments.  
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2.40 Of  equal  importance  were  arrangements  for  undertaking  policy 
costings during the 2013 election caretaker period. The departments agreed on 
arrangements  for  preparing  election  costings  on  13  August  2013,  including 
their respective responsibilities during the period.  
Protecting the confidentiality of information 
2.41 In  late  2011,  during  the  Government’s  deliberations  on  operational 
aspects  of  the  PBO,  consideration  was  given  to  legislative  amendments  to 
protect  the confidentiality of PBO  requests. At  the  time of establishment,  the 
PBO was designated an exempt agency under the FOI Act.77 However, specific 
exemption was not provided for documents relating to requests from the PBO 
that  were  held  by  Commonwealth  agencies.  This  had  the  potential  to 
undermine  the  processes  of  the  PBO,  an  essential  part  of  which  was  the 
confidentiality  of  the  work  conducted  for  parliamentarians  outside  the 
caretaker  period.  An  amending  bill  was  introduced  into  Parliament  on 
10 October 2012, to extend the exemption for documents held by agencies and 
relating  to PBO  requests. The  bill was  subject  to  a  Senate  inquiry,  and  later 
received royal assent on 4 December 2012.78 
2.42 In  early  2013,  further  legislative  amendment  was  made.  Privacy 
provisions  in  the  Taxation  Administration  Act  1953  precluded  the  PBO  from 
accessing  the  taxpayer  information  used  by  Treasury  in  compiling  budget 
revenue  estimates,  without  significant  data  manipulation  by  the  Australian 
Taxation  Office  in  order  to  protect  taxpayer’s  privacy.  On  29 June 2013,  the 
Parliamentary  Service  Amendment  (Parliamentary  Budget  Officer)  Act  2013 
removed  this  restriction  and  provided  the  PBO  with  the  same  confidential 
access  to  this data  that Treasury has, along with  the equivalent obligation  to 
protect taxpayer privacy. The same amending Act also endowed the PBO with 
another  function,  that  it  produce  the  Post‐Election  Report  on  the  election 
commitments of designated parliamentary parties. 
                                                     
77  As amended by the Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Officer) Act 2011, and 
discussed in paragraph 1.10. 
78  The Freedom of Information Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Office) Bill 2012 amended the FOI Act 
by providing exemption for Commonwealth agencies for information relating to PBO requests. The 
PBO’s arrangements with agencies for acquiring information, and the views of these agencies, are 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this report. 
 
ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 
The Administration of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
 
60 
2.40 Of  equal  importance  were  arrangements  for  undertaking  policy 
costings during the 2013 election caretaker period. The departments agreed on 
arrangements  for  preparing  election  costings  on  13  August  2013,  including 
their respective responsibilities during the period.  
Protecting the confidentiality of information 
2.41 In  late  2011,  during  the  Government’s  deliberations  on  operational 
aspects  of  the  PBO,  consideration  was  given  to  legislative  amendments  to 
protect  the confidentiality of PBO  requests. At  the  time of establishment,  the 
PBO was designated an exempt agency under the FOI Act.77 However, specific 
exemption was not provided for documents relating to requests from the PBO 
that  were  held  by  Commonwealth  agencies.  This  had  the  potential  to 
undermine  the  processes  of  the  PBO,  an  essential  part  of  which  was  the 
confidentiality  of  the  work  conducted  for  parliamentarians  outside  the 
caretaker  period.  An  amending  bill  was  introduced  into  Parliament  on 
10 October 2012, to extend the exemption for documents held by agencies and 
relating  to PBO  requests. The  bill was  subject  to  a  Senate  inquiry,  and  later 
received royal assent on 4 December 2012.78 
2.42 In  early  2013,  further  legislative  amendment  was  made.  Privacy 
provisions  in  the  Taxation  Administration  Act  1953  precluded  the  PBO  from 
accessing  the  taxpayer  information  used  by  Treasury  in  compiling  budget 
revenue  estimates,  without  significant  data  manipulation  by  the  Australian 
Taxation  Office  in  order  to  protect  taxpayer’s  privacy.  On  29 June 2013,  the 
Parliamentary  Service  Amendment  (Parliamentary  Budget  Officer)  Act  2013 
removed  this  restriction  and  provided  the  PBO  with  the  same  confidential 
access  to  this data  that Treasury has, along with  the equivalent obligation  to 
protect taxpayer privacy. The same amending Act also endowed the PBO with 
another  function,  that  it  produce  the  Post‐Election  Report  on  the  election 
commitments of designated parliamentary parties. 
                                                     
77  As amended by the Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Officer) Act 2011, and 
discussed in paragraph 1.10. 
78  The Freedom of Information Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Office) Bill 2012 amended the FOI Act 
by providing exemption for Commonwealth agencies for information relating to PBO requests. The 
PBO’s arrangements with agencies for acquiring information, and the views of these agencies, are 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this report. 
Establishment and Governance of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
 
ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 




2.43 The  work  done  prior  to  and  during  the  establishment  of  the  PBO 
enabled it to accept requests from parliamentarians from 28 August 2012,  just 
over  five  weeks  after  beginning  operations  on  23  July  2012.  This  work 
incorporated the key elements of implementation planning, such as identifying 
priorities  and  critical  success  factors,  as  well  as  workforce  planning, 
developing  systems  and  processes,  and  building  relationships  with 
stakeholders and clients. The PBO’s workforce planning approach enabled it to 
recruit  suitably  qualified  staff  and  develop  a  surge  capacity  for  peak 
workloads.  A  comprehensive  operations  manual,  containing  staff  induction 




established  an  appropriate  protected  network  to  secure  the  confidential 
information  it  uses  for  policy  costings  and  self‐initiated  research,  but  the 
associated  governance  documentation  is  yet  to  be  finalised.  At  the  time  of 
conducting  this  audit  the  PBO  had  established,  or  was  in  the  process  of 
finalising,  appropriate  administrative  and  governance  and  administrative 
arrangements  such as business planning,  risk management  and performance 
reporting.  There  would  be  merit  in  the  PBO  reviewing  its  KPIs  to  better 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the PBO in performing all of its functions; and 
finalising  governance  documentation  to  reflect  the  services  provided  by  the 
DPS in managing its IT network and associated systems. 
2.45 Key  issues  that  had  the  potential  to  affect  the  PBO’s  performance 
during  its  establishment  have  effectively  been  resolved.  These  included: 
extending the freedom of information exemption to protect the confidentiality 
surrounding parliamentarians’ requests for information held by agencies; and 
legislative  amendment  to  allow  the  Australian  Taxation  Office  to  provide 
de‐identified tax data to the PBO. In addition, the PBO, Treasury and Finance 
have  worked  proactively  to  develop  a  cooperative  relationship. 
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3. Access to Information 










3.2 To  assess  the  PBO’s  access  to  information,  the ANAO  examined  the 
processes  for  requesting  and  receiving  information  from  Commonwealth 
agencies.  The  ANAO  also  sought  feedback  from  20  of  the  Commonwealth 
agencies that supply information to the PBO. 
Arrangements for the PBO’s access to information 
3.3 The  PS  Act  does  not  give  the  PBO  statutory  information  gathering 
powers.  Rather,  two  instruments  facilitate  the  PBO’s  access  to  information 
from Commonwealth agencies: the Protocols and the MoU.79 
The Protocols 
3.4 The  Protocols  provide  a  broad  statement  of  the  Australian 
Government’s  intent  to  support  the PBO  in  the performance of  its  functions 
and outline the responsibilities of staff engaging with the PBO. Signed by the 
Prime Minister, the Treasurer and the Minister for Finance, the Protocols make 
it  clear  that  the  PBO  requires  access  to  information  and  documents  owned, 




79  The Protocols and the MoU are available on the PBO’s website 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office> 
[Accessed 20 February 2014]. 
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agencies.  The  ANAO  also  sought  feedback  from  20  of  the  Commonwealth 
agencies that supply information to the PBO. 
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The Protocols 
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Government’s  intent  to  support  the PBO  in  the performance of  its  functions 
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79  The Protocols and the MoU are available on the PBO’s website 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office> 
[Accessed 20 February 2014]. 
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parties,  the  process  for  requesting  and  providing  information,  avenues  of 
communication and dispute resolution. 
Confidentiality 
3.6 Outside  the  caretaker  period,  parliamentarians  can  elect  to  have 
requests, including costings, prepared on a confidential basis.81 To give force to 
these provisions, the Protocols and the MoU state that: 
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them  with  any  information  which  would  disclose  the  nature  of  a 
confidential request from the PBO; and 
 agencies must not disclose the details of a request for information and 
the subsequent  response  to a  third party, other  than another agency, 
unless required to do so by law. 
3.7 In  December  2012,  Finance  issued  additional  guidance  material  to 
agencies  in  relation  to  their  dealings  with  the  PBO.  Amongst  other  things, 
Finance advised agencies to put procedures in place to ensure that confidential 
information provided  to  the PBO  is not disclosed  through  regular  reporting 
and  advice  to  government  ministers.  The  20  Commonwealth  agencies 




80  The MoU was not amended after the 2013 Machinery of Government changes and at the time of writing 
this report, there were 20 agencies: the Attorney-General’s Department; Australian Bureau of Statistics; 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service; Australian Taxation Office; Public Service 
Commission; and the Departments of: Agriculture; Communications; Defence; Education; Employment; 
Environment; Foreign Affairs and Trade; Health; Human Services; Immigration and Border Protection; 
Industry; Infrastructure and Regional Development; Prime Minister and Cabinet; Social Services; and 
Veterans’ Affairs. 
81  Section 64M and subsection 64H(3)(d) of the PS Act detail the confidentiality provisions. In contrast, 
requests for election policy costings made during the caretaker period must be publicly available, 
consistent with the Charter of Budget Honesty. 
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The process of requesting and receiving information 
3.8 The PBO requests  information  if  it  is needed  to conduct any of  its six 
functions, and may require data  from a particular agency or a costing model 
developed  by  that  agency.  Some  information  requested,  such  as  statistical 
databases,  may  have  a  general  use  for  a  variety  of  costings  and  research 
projects, while other  requests may be  related  to a  specific  costing. Typically, 
information requested  includes program and sub‐program estimates, data on 
activity levels, expenditure and client statistics, costing models, and updates of 
previously  supplied  information.  Figure  3.1  illustrates  the  process  by which 
information is requested by the PBO and provided by agencies. 
3.9 The  PBO’s  Operations  Manual  contains  instructions  for  staff  on  the 





3.10 The  Information Request Register  is an essential  tool  for  the PBO, but 
its  spreadsheet  functionality means  that only one  staff member has access at 
any  time,  and  this  creates  difficulties  in  busy  work  periods.  The  ANAO’s 
review  of  the  spreadsheet  found  data  sets  that  had  not  been  consistently 
completed, and the PBO advised that these fields became redundant over time 
as  the  information was not needed  for  tracking purposes.  In addition, whilst 
acknowledging the experience of PBO staff, there is the potential that the data 
and functionality of the spreadsheet could be corrupted through user error. In 
late  2013,  the  PBO  conducted  an  ‘After Action Review‘  of  its  activities,  and 
documented shortcomings with the Information Request Register. As a result, 
the PBO intends developing a purpose built registration system to replace this 
register and  the Costing Register, which  is  expected  to be delivered  in  early 
2015.82 
                                                     
82  The Costing Register is discussed in Chapter 4, and the project to deliver the purpose built registration 
system is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 3.1: The process for requesting and receiving information 
 
Source:  ANAO interpretation of the Protocols, MoU and the PBO’s Operations Manual. 
Note:  The timeframes for response (urgent within five days, routine within 10 days, and during the 
caretaker period within three days) are indicative, and agencies can negotiate these with the PBO.  
3.11 The  PBO  stores  all  the  information  it  obtains  in  its  data  repository. 
Before the PBO’s protected network was operational, the repository existed in 
external  hard drives  kept  under  appropriate  security.  From December  2013, 
the repository is on both the PBO’s protected network and external hard drives 
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send ad hoc  information requests  to agencies. The PBO advised  that  the data 
repository  has  enabled  the  PBO  to  progress  a  number  of  costings  without 
having to seek information from agencies, so in this regard it has realised the 
intended benefits. 
Information requests to agencies 
3.12 The PBO monitors and reports the number of information requests sent 
to  agencies,  and  the  responsiveness  of  these  agencies,  both  in  its  Annual 
Report  and  in  reports  to  the  Senate  Finance  and  Public  Administration 
Legislation  Committee.  Since  the  establishment  of  the  PBO  in  July  2012  to 
30 April 2014,  the  PBO  has  sent  679  information  requests  (total  minus 
23 superseded  requests)  to  52 agencies.  Table  3.1  reports  PBO  data  on  the 
number of information requests sent by the PBO between July 2012 and March 
2014, and the responsiveness of agencies (collectively) for this period.83 
Table 3.1: PBO information requests and responsiveness of agencies, 




due date (%) 
Responded after 
due date (%) 
Average business 
days late(1) 
2012 85 43 (51) 42 (49) 3.4 
2013 Qtr 1 100 35 (35) 65 (65) 11.1 
2013 Qtr 2 175 75 (43) 100 (57) 4.9 
2013 Qtr 3 234 126 (54) 108 (46) 2.0 
2013 Qtr 4 16 11 (69) 5 (31)(2) 0.1 
2014 Qtr 1 43 23 (53) 20 (47)(2) 0.8 
Total 653 313 (48) 340 (52) - 
Source: PBO data. 
Note 1: Average lateness is calculated using the days late for all requests (which can include negative 
figures if responses were made early). 
Note 2: Overdue requests were also included in this total, one for 2013 Qtr 4, and seven for 2014 Qtr 1. 
3.13 The number of  information  requests peaked during  the  2013  election 
period as there were an increasing number of requests from parliamentarians, 
                                                     
83  April 2014 is not included in this table, as some information requests had not been responded to, but 
were not yet late. 
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have  since  reduced with  fewer  requests  from parliamentarians. The  average 
time  taken  by  agencies  to  respond  has  improved,  with  responses  being  an 
average of 11.1 days late in the first quarter of 2013 but 0.8 days late in the first 
quarter  of  2014  (the  median  response  time  was  nine  business  days).  The 
ANAO observed  that  factors contributing  to  this  improvement  include  fewer 
recent requests from the PBO, and more of those requests involving updates to 







Table 3.2: Agencies that received 20 or more information requests, 
September 2012 to March 2014 

















Treasury 117 6 39 42 30 14 
Industry 68 9 30 20 9 4 
Finance 56 4 20 24 8 2 
Employment 50 3 20 17 10 3 
Social Services 50 8 15 16 11 1 
Health 34 4 14 10 6 4 
Human Services 28 3 9 12 4 0 
Infrastructure and 
Regional Development 
28 4 11 8 5 1 
Australian Taxation Office 26 1 9 11 5 6 
Veterans’ Affairs 23 3 5 14 1 0 
Total 480 45 172 174 89 - 
Source: ANAO analysis of PBO data. 
Note 1: Timeframes set by the PBO are urgent (five days), routine (10 days), and caretaker period (three 
days), but various timeframes are recorded because the PBO has been asked for an extension. 
3.14 As  at  31 March  2014,  of  the  52 agencies  that  have  received  requests, 
10 of these agencies received 73.5 per cent of the total requests, with Treasury 
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receiving  the  most  requests  (17.9  per  cent).  There  is  understandably  a 
correlation  between  the  agencies  that  have  received  the  highest  number  of 
information requests, and the longest timeframes for provision of information. 
However, when compared  to  the data  in Table 3.2,  there  is also a correlation 
between  requests  made  early  in  the  operation  of  the  PBO  and  the  longer 
timeframes  taken  to  provide  information.  Many  factors  can  influence  the 
timeliness of an agency’s response, and these are discussed in paragraph 3.19.  
Feedback from Commonwealth agencies 
3.15 The ANAO contacted all agencies that are signatories to the MoU (post 
Machinery  of  Government  departmental  changes)  and  interviewed  officers 
representing 20 of these agencies (Appendix 3 contains a list of all stakeholders 
consulted by  the ANAO). Agencies were asked about  the processes  followed 
when  responding  to PBO  information  requests,  feedback on  their  interaction 
with the PBO, as well as any other comments they wished to make. Table 3.3 
provides a summary of the agencies’ feedback. 
Table 3.3: Summary of comments made by agencies 
Question Yes No Comments volunteered by agencies 
Is the MoU effective?  20 0 No agencies reported any concerns with the MoU.  
Have PBO 
information requests 
had an effect on your 
agency’s resources? 
20 0 All agencies reported some effect on resources, but 
18 had not formally recorded the implications. 
The two agencies with formal records reported 
365 hours and 381.5 hours respectively. Anecdotally, 
another agency said one full-time Australian Public 
Service level 5 staff member was needed to service 
PBO requests, whilst another said that hundreds of 
hours were spent because of the large number of 
models held by the agency.  
Are the timeframes 
for response 
reasonable? 
1 17 Sixteen reported that their ability to meet the 
timeframes depended on the complexity of the request 
and other workload, but the PBO was accommodating 
when asked for extensions. 
Seven reported that most PBO requests were ‘urgent’ 
and that they had no real sense of why.  
Nine reported that they could provide quicker and 
more accurate information if the PBO was able to be 
clearer about the information it sought.  
Have there been any 
disputes with the 
PBO? 
0 20 Agencies did, however, report instances of differences 
in opinion in timeframes and the types of information 
the agency could supply, with five uncertain about 
supplying Cabinet- or Budget-in-Confidence material. 
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Question Yes No Comments volunteered by agencies 
Are there concerns 
about the PBO’s use 
of the confidential 
information your 
agency has provided? 
0 18 No agency was concerned about the PBO’s ability to 
maintain confidentiality, although, at times some 
placed caveats on the further dissemination of data. 
One reported a potential future risk for the release of 
de-identified personal data, as unique demographics 
can sometimes be identified.  




20 0 All were positive, variously describing the PBO as 
professional, communicative and reasonable. Fourteen 
that had a large number of requests from the PBO 
reported early relationship-building meetings and a 
high level of engagement from the PBO. 
Is your agency able to 
supply all of the 
information that the 
PBO requests? 
13 5 Thirteen agencies reported supplying what the PBO 
asked for. Five agencies however, were not able to 
supply particular information as the information was 
not held by the agency, or was too complex to collate. 
Two agencies could not immediately supply 
information without a legislative amendment, or a 
waiver of legislative provisions. 
Source: ANAO analysis of information provided in interviews with 20 Commonwealth agencies. 
Note: The ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ figures do not always total 20 as not all agencies answered all questions. 
3.16 In addition to  the  feedback presented  in Table 3.3, several key  themes 
arose during the process of interviewing the 20 agencies. These included:  
 the PBO’s  ability  to  access  the  information  it needed,  and  the  role of 
Treasury and Finance in the information gathering process;  
 confidentiality arrangements put in place by the PBO; 
 the  agency’s  visibility  of  the  inclusion  of  administrative  expenses  in 
policy costings; and  
 potential improvements to the information request process.  
The PBO’s ability to access the information it needs 
3.17 All 20 agencies reported a general  intent  to adhere  to  the spirit of  the 
Protocols in providing everything they could to the PBO. Agencies were aware 
of  the  significance  of  the  PBO’s  role,  and  four  stated  that  it  was  to  their 
advantage  to  provide  accurate  information  as  a  PBO  costing  may  become 
government policy in the future. Where there was uncertainty about providing 
particular information, agencies could contact Finance for clarification. 
3.18 Some  agencies  proactively  engaged  with  the  PBO  to  clarify  the 
information  requested.  The  PBO  was  also  proactive,  with  fourteen  agencies 
reporting  early  contact  from  the  PBO,  including  meetings  that  helped  to 
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establish  an  ongoing  working  relationship.  Many  agencies  now  regularly 
provide updated data and models to the PBO without requests being made. 
3.19 There were, however,  instances where agencies  could not provide all 





 where  information  sourced  from multiple  areas  or  portfolio  agencies 
required coordination and checking; and 
 when the agency was servicing multiple PBO requests at once.  
The  PBO  also  reported  that,  at  times,  agencies  needed  to  undertake 
considerable work  to document  costing models  that had been developed  for 
internal use, prior to the model being provided to the PBO.  
3.20 There  were  only  three  instances  where  the  PBO  was  impeded  in 
accessing  information. Two were  resolved  through  legislation84, and  the PBO 
advised  the  ANAO  that  no  others  arose  prior  to  preparing  this  report. 
However,  the  PBO  does  not  have  access  to  the  details  of  provisions  for 
individual  items  included  in  the Contingency Reserve.85 The Secretary of  the 
then  Department  of  Finance  and  Deregulation  decided  in  July 2013  that 
providing  such  information  would  be  contrary  to  the  public  interest.  In 
July 2013, as a mitigating measure, the PBO released guidance on the possible 
impact of this on PBO costings, stating that all PBO costings were prepared in 
the absence of  this  information.86 While  this only affected  two policy costings 
during  the preparing  the  2013 Post‐Election Report87,  the  likelihood  remains 
                                                     
84  One impediment was the previously mentioned amendment to the Taxation Administration Act 1953, 
and the other required a legislative waiver to be authorised by the Secretary of the department involved. 
85  The Contingency Reserve is an allowance included in the aggregate budget expenses for the budget to 
reflect anticipated events that cannot be assigned to individual programs in the preparation of the 
Budget estimates—see Statement 6 of Budget Paper 1. The Reserve is designed to ensure that 
aggregate estimates are as close as possible to expected outcomes and is not intended to be a general 
policy reserve.  
86  PBO, Possible Impact of Contingency Reserve on PBO costings, PBO Guidance 05/2013, 23 July 2013. 
87  The two costings were: Regional Cooperation to Combat People Smuggling (Coalition) and Safer 
pathways for refugees policy, refugee health and end immigration detention (Australian Greens). As the 
former Government had included costs for operating the processing facility on Nauru in the Contingency 
Reserve, the PBO was not aware of the quantum of the allowance made and, as a consequence, the 
potential savings from the non-operation of that facility. 
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However,  the  PBO  does  not  have  access  to  the  details  of  provisions  for 
individual  items  included  in  the Contingency Reserve.85 The Secretary of  the 
then  Department  of  Finance  and  Deregulation  decided  in  July 2013  that 
providing  such  information  would  be  contrary  to  the  public  interest.  In 
July 2013, as a mitigating measure, the PBO released guidance on the possible 
impact of this on PBO costings, stating that all PBO costings were prepared in 
the absence of  this  information.86 While  this only affected  two policy costings 
during  the preparing  the  2013 Post‐Election Report87,  the  likelihood  remains 
                                                     
84  One impediment was the previously mentioned amendment to the Taxation Administration Act 1953, 
and the other required a legislative waiver to be authorised by the Secretary of the department involved. 
85  The Contingency Reserve is an allowance included in the aggregate budget expenses for the budget to 
reflect anticipated events that cannot be assigned to individual programs in the preparation of the 
Budget estimates—see Statement 6 of Budget Paper 1. The Reserve is designed to ensure that 
aggregate estimates are as close as possible to expected outcomes and is not intended to be a general 
policy reserve.  
86  PBO, Possible Impact of Contingency Reserve on PBO costings, PBO Guidance 05/2013, 23 July 2013. 
87  The two costings were: Regional Cooperation to Combat People Smuggling (Coalition) and Safer 
pathways for refugees policy, refugee health and end immigration detention (Australian Greens). As the 
former Government had included costs for operating the processing facility on Nauru in the Contingency 
Reserve, the PBO was not aware of the quantum of the allowance made and, as a consequence, the 
potential savings from the non-operation of that facility. 
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that  the PBO may not be able  to determine  the net budget  impact of  certain 
policies in the future because it does not have access to this information. 
The role of Treasury and Finance 
3.21 The Protocols indicate that Treasury and Finance have a central role in 
the PBO’s information gathering process, with a view to ensuring the integrity 
of  the  Government’s  official  budget  estimates.  One  step  in  the  information 
request process—to provide copies of all  requests and  responses  to Treasury 
and Finance—was designed for this express purpose. The need for consistency 
of  information  held  by  the  PBO,  Treasury  and  Finance  takes  on  particular 
significance  in  the  caretaker  period  where  all  three  agencies  undertake  the 
costing of election commitments.  
3.22 Importantly, being copied into requests allows Treasury and Finance to 




to  be  aware  of.  Treasury  advised  that  it  does  not  check  the  information 
provided by agencies, but the majority of revenue requests made by the PBO 
are produced by Treasury or are cleared by Treasury  first. The PBO advised 
the ANAO  that  it  is not aware of a  situation where Treasury or Finance has 
raised with the PBO the need to update data provided by an agency but these 
issues  may  have  been  raised  with  agencies  prior  to  the  information  being 
provided  to  the  PBO.  The  PBO  also  advised  the  ANAO  that  because  of 
confidentiality  concerns,  requests  are  framed  so  that  even  the  Treasury  and 
Finance would not be able to specifically determine the purpose for which the 
information  would  be  used.  As  such,  Finance  or  Treasury  may  not  be  in  a 
position  to ascertain  the extent  to which  information provided by an agency 
meets the needs of the PBO.  
Confidentiality of information 
3.23 None  of  the  20  agencies  interviewed  by  the  ANAO  were  concerned 
about the PBO’s treatment of their confidential information (and they reported 
that  the  PBO  clarified  the  information  that  could  be  released  to 
parliamentarians).88  However,  agencies  raised  an  issue  about  the  PBO’s 
                                                     
88  Both the MoU and the PS Act require the PBO to protect the confidentiality of information provided by 
an agency if directed by the head of the agency. 
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approach  to  requesting  information,  where  the  requestor  had  stipulated 
confidentiality.  In  such  circumstances,  the  PBO  does  not  discuss  how  the 
information will be used, and agencies comments included:  







 four  were  concerned  about  subsequently  being  expected  by 
government to deliver programs within the amount costed by the PBO, 
even  if  this costing was  inaccurate because of  imperfect data.  In  these 
circumstances, seven agencies reported they often contacted the PBO to 
clarify what was  needed  and  to  discuss what  the  agency  could  best 
supply; 
 seven querying whether a  lack of clarity might also be caused by  the 
PBO not knowing exactly  the  information  it needed. However,  two of 
these  seven  agencies  (both  of  which  had  received  more  than 
20 requests)  reported  that  request  clarity had  improved over  time,  as 
the  PBO’s  officers  became  more  knowledgeable  about  the  particular 
portfolio; and 
 another  agency  questioned  the  need  for  confidentiality  between  the 
PBO and  the agency at all. This agency  felt  that, as  the Protocols and 
the MoU both require strict non‐disclosure of the details of a request or 








arguments  in  favour  of  strict  confidentiality,  as  the  PBO’s  primary  client  is 
parliamentarians.  In  March 2014,  the  United  Kingdom’s  Institute  for 
Government  released  a  study  of  pre‐election  policy  costing  processes  in 
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Australia and  Ireland. The  confidentiality of  the  costing process was  seen as 
critical  in  encouraging  political  parties  to  be  more  transparent  about  policy 
costs, as parties must be confident that policies and costings will not be leaked 
until the party is ready to release the information.89 The Parliamentary Budget 
Officer  advised  the  ANAO  that  the  decision  to  maintain  such  strict 
confidentiality is also based on the risk of damaging the PBO’s reputation with 
its  clients. Where  a parliamentarian  elects  for  a  costing  to  be  confidential,  a 
detailed description of  the  information sought would  increase  the  risk of  the 
policy being identified. This could put at risk the confidentiality of the request, 
and potentially the willingness of the parliamentarian to use the PBO.  
3.25 Parliamentary  stakeholders‘  feedback  to  the  ANAO  emphasised  the 
importance  of  confidentiality  to  their  policy  development  processes.  They 
confirmed  that  confidentiality  strengthens  the  PBO’s  capacity  to  provide 
assistance to parliament; allows costings to occur in a considered manner; and 
subsequently  improves  the  policy  debate.  One  party  commented  that  it 
recognised the confidentiality of the PBO’s information requests created a risk 
of the PBO producing  less accurate costings, but on balance, the party would 
be  more  concerned  if  this  confidentiality  was  relaxed  with  agencies.  The 
feedback  from  agencies  nevertheless  underlines  the  benefits  of  the  PBO 
providing sufficient context in relation to each information request to position 
agencies to provide the most appropriate information in response to requests, 
while being  respectful of maintaining  the confidentiality of  the costing when 
this has been requested. 
Visibility of the inclusion of administrative expenses in policy 
costings 
3.26 Another  issue  raised  by  agencies  was  the  apparent  non‐inclusion  of 
administrative expenses in PBO costings. Agency administrative expenses can 
include  items  such  as  physical  and  systems  infrastructure,  training, 
advertising,  and  staff  and  other  administrative  resources  to prepare  for  and 
implement  a  new  policy.  Eight  agencies  were  concerned  that  significant 
expenses,  such  as  IT  systems  development  and  tender  processes,  did  not 
appear  to  have  been  included  in  the  policy  costings  prepared  by  the  PBO. 
Agencies  do  not  see  the  results  of  confidential  costings,  so  these  comments 
                                                     
89  Institute for Government, Pre-election Policy Costing Mechanisms in Australia, Whitehall in year Five of 
the Coalition: Lessons from Elsewhere, 19 March 2014, United Kingdom, pp. 16–17. 
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were made with reference  to  the publicly released policy costings during  the 
caretaker period and in the PBO’s Post‐Election Report.  
3.27 The PBO costs policies based on the Charter of Budget Honesty Policy 
Costing  Guidelines  (Charter  Guidelines)90  which  specify  the  inclusion  of 
agency  administrative  expenses  where  requested  and  feasible.  The  PBO 
template  for costing  requests  includes specific questions  for parliamentarians 
about  including  agency  expenses  associated  in  the  costing,  or  whether  the 
agency  will  be  expected  to  absorb  expenses  associated  with  the  policy.  For 
some confidential costings,  the PBO may not be able  to discuss any aspect of 
these expenses with  the agency, although  in  such  instances  the PBO may be 
able  to  identify  similar  previous  Budget  measures,  or  may  have  access  to 
established  agency models,  to  calculate  such  costs.  The  PBO  advised  that  it 
does  consult  with  agencies,  particularly  where  it  considers  that  a  proposal 
includes a significant IT cost. 
3.28 The  ANAO  examined  the  documentation  for  the  costings  that  had 
costing documentation included in the Post‐Election Report (92 costings of the 
434 items  included  in  the  report).  Of  the  92  costings,  43  had  agency 
administrative  expenses  included,  26  did  not  (the  expenses  were  noted  as 
being minimal and not estimated, or the costing indicated the expenses were to 
be absorbed), and 23 could not be assessed (due to there being no mention of 
the  expenses,  the  policy  being  for  the  termination  of  a  program,  the  policy 




to  inclusion  of  administrative  expenses,  and  the  response  that  the  PBO 
provided  in  its  finalised  costing.91  A  summary  of  the  ANAO’s  results  is 
provided in Figure 3.2. 
                                                     
90  The PS Act requires the PBO to follow the Charter Guidelines if the Parliamentary Budget Officer has 
not issued his/her own written principles. At the time of preparing this report, the Parliamentary Budget 
Officer had not issued his own costing principles. 
91  The 126 costings were part of a larger indicative sample of 240 records examined by the ANAO, from 
the PBO’s Costing Register. 
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90  The PS Act requires the PBO to follow the Charter Guidelines if the Parliamentary Budget Officer has 
not issued his/her own written principles. At the time of preparing this report, the Parliamentary Budget 
Officer had not issued his own costing principles. 
91  The 126 costings were part of a larger indicative sample of 240 records examined by the ANAO, from 
the PBO’s Costing Register. 
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Figure 3.2: Results of ANAO testing of the PBO’s inclusion of agency 
administrative expenses 
 
Source: ANAO examination of PBO costing records.  
Note: Not all percentages equal 100 per cent due to rounding effects. 
3.30 The ANAO tallied where the PBO had treated administrative expenses 






 the  parliamentarian  requested  that  the  PBO  include  administrative 
expenses  within  a  capped  policy  (for  example,  a  grants  program). 
Where  the  PBO  considered  that  the  administrative  expenses  would 
consume  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  overall  costed  amount,  the 
PBO added them to the total cost of the policy. 
The  difference  in  the  PBO’s  treatment  of  agency  administrative  expenses 
compared to the parliamentarian’s request is provided in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Difference in the PBO’s treatment of agency administrative 
expenses compared with the parliamentarian’s request 
 Number Percentage 
Agreement on treatment of administrative expenses 92 73% 
Difference in treatment of administrative expenses 34 27% 
Total 126 100% 
Source: ANAO examination of PBO costing records. 
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3.31 Notwithstanding  the  parameters  set  by  the  requesting 
parliamentarians, in 27 per cent of costings examined by the ANAO, the PBO’s 
decision about treatment of agency administrative expenses differed from the 
request  (either  including or excluding  these  expenses). The PBO advised  the 
ANAO  that  it  makes  a  judgement  about  the  inclusion  of  administrative 
expenses  for  each  policy.  The  PBO  advised  that  its  assessment  focuses  on 
whether or not  those expenses are significant  in  the context of  implementing 
that  specific  policy,  and  not  on whether  the  agency  is  able  to  absorb  those 





the agency.  If  the proposal  is  for a  simple one‐off grants program  for 
agencies  that  regularly  administer  grants  it  is  unlikely  to  involve 
significant  additional  work,  but  proposals  involving  new  payments, 
new eligibility criteria or new client populations would; 
 the  parliamentarian  requesting  the  costing  has  specified  that  the 
proposal  is  for  a  capped  amount  of  funding,  and  administrative 
expenses are to be met within the amount. In such cases, if the expenses 
do  not  change  the  bottom  line  of  the  proposal  they  may  not  be 
separately identified92; or 
 the parliamentarian  specifies  that  agency  administrative  expenses  are 
to  be  absorbed  by  the  agency. The PBO  still determines whether  the 
expenses  are  significant,  and  if  so,  includes  them  in  the  costing. The 




3.32 The PBO also advised  the ANAO  that, unlike Finance which allocates 
funding,  the  PBO  it  is  not  in  the  position  to  know  if  an  agency  has  excess 
                                                     
92  In those circumstances where the PBO considers the administrative expenses would significantly impact 
on the intent of the policy, the PBO may include these expenses as an addition to the policy’s cost. For 
example, if the parliamentarian has requested that administrative expenses for an industry subsidy 
program are to be met within a capped amount, but the costs of administering the subsidy would be 
significant when compared with the capped cost, and would materially reduce the amount of the subsidy 
that could be paid. 
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still has  to go  through  the process of costing by  the Government, and  this  is 
when the discussion about administrative costs can occur.  
3.33 In  the  interests of  transparency,  there  is a strong argument  for always 
separately  including  administrative  expenses  (where  significant  to  the 
implementation  of  the  policy)  in  a  costing,  including  for  capped  proposals. 
This  would  fairly  present  the  full  cost  of  implementing  a  proposal,  and  its 
administrative  and  program  components,  to  the  parliamentarian who made 
the  request.  The  ANAO  has  commented  in  various  reports  about  the 
challenges  to  policy  implementation  that  agencies  face,  and  that  a 
government’s policy agenda  relies not only on  the provision of sound policy 
advice  but  on  the  effective  implementation  of  new  programs.93  One  of  the 
essential  elements  of  program  implementation  is  to  understand  the 
administrative  expenses  needed  to  support  the  implementation  process, 
particularly where they are significant.  
Recommendation No.1  
3.34 In  the  interests of greater  transparency,  the ANAO  recommends  that 
the  Parliamentary  Budget  Office  includes  in  all  costings,  estimates  of 
administrative expenses, where significant. 
PBO response: Agreed. 
Potential process improvements 
3.35 Agencies acknowledged that the PBO had a difficult task to establish an 
office in a busy election period, and that it now has a good foundation to work 
from.  These  agencies  also  made  some  process  improvement  suggestions 
around how the PBO requests information: 






93  For example: ANAO, Audit Report No.9 2010–11, Green Loans Program; and Audit Report No.12 
2010–11, Home Insulation Program. 
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 seven  agencies  reported  that  most  PBO  requests  are  classified  as 
‘urgent’,  leaving  them with  no  sense  of what was  urgent  or  routine. 
Despite these concerns, 16 agencies reported that the PBO was flexible 
and  accommodating when  informed  that  the  response would  not  be 
supplied within the timeframe. The ANAO’s analysis of the urgency of 
requests  sent  to  the  ‘top  10’  agencies  showed  that  almost  30 per cent 
(142  of  the  480  total  requests)  had  timeframes  of  five  days  or  less, 
however  this analysis does not reflect where request  timeframes were 
extended by  the PBO. While  there  are many  factors  involved  in how 
quickly  an  agency  can  respond  to  a  request,  the PBO  could  consider 
advising agencies and requestors as  to how  it determines  the urgency 
of requests; and 
 five  agencies  questioned  if  they  could  have  more  involvement  in 
costings  that  included  their  portfolio  areas,  as  certain  policy  areas 
needed  large  teams  to  run  models  due  to  the  complexity  of  the 
interactions with other policies. The task of the PBO, with a small staff 
and  large  cross‐portfolio  coverage, was acknowledged by agencies  as 
difficult. One  large agency with multiple models had arranged  to run 
its models in‐house and provided the results to the PBO.  
3.36 While  the PBO has provided  copies of models  for publically  released 
costings  to  agencies  that  have  requested  them,  at  the  time  of  writing  this 
report, the PBO had not sought feedback from agencies about the information 
request process. At  the  time of  interview,  agencies had  also not offered  any 
formal  feedback  to  the  PBO.  Three  agencies  reported  that  they  would  like 
feedback  on  how  their  data  was  being  used,  for  quality  improvement 
purposes, and one reported that the MoU opened the possibility for two‐way 
exchange  and  it  would  like  the  PBO  to  reciprocate  information  sharing. 
Overall,  the ANAO  considers  that  there would be merit  in  the PBO  seeking 





conduct  self‐initiated  research.  The  Protocols  and  MoU  contain  guidance 
covering  all parties  and  the  20  agencies  interviewed by  the ANAO  reported 
adhering  to  the  intent of  the Protocols. The PBO  advised  the ANAO  that  to 
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 seven  agencies  reported  that  most  PBO  requests  are  classified  as 
‘urgent’,  leaving  them with  no  sense  of what was  urgent  or  routine. 
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of requests; and 
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costings  that  included  their  portfolio  areas,  as  certain  policy  areas 
needed  large  teams  to  run  models  due  to  the  complexity  of  the 
interactions with other policies. The task of the PBO, with a small staff 
and  large  cross‐portfolio  coverage, was acknowledged by agencies  as 
difficult. One  large agency with multiple models had arranged  to run 
its models in‐house and provided the results to the PBO.  
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date  it  had  been  able  to  access  the  information  it  needed  to  conduct  its 
functions, but on occasion there have been long delays in getting information. 
At present, there is no indication of any need for change in these arrangements 







undertake due  to  lack  of  access  to  information,  including  information  about 
the Contingency Reserve. 
3.38 The PBO is well regarded by the 20 agencies interviewed by the ANAO 
and  no  agency  expressed  any  concerns  about  the  PBO’s  ability  to  keep 
sensitive  information confidential. Agencies however raised  two  issues about 
the PBO’s administrative arrangements  for obtaining  information. Firstly,  the 
approach  adopted  by  the  PBO  to  protect  the  confidentiality  of 
parliamentarian’s requests can make  it difficult  for agencies  to determine  the 
most  pertinent  information  to  provide.  Secondly,  there  is  a  perception  that 
potentially significant administrative expenses may not be  included  for some 
costings.  There  are  strong  arguments  supporting  the  confidentiality  of  the 
costing  process  to  encourage  political  parties  to  be  more  transparent  about 
policy  costs.  There  is  also  a  strong  argument  for  always  including  agency 
administrative  expenses  (where  significant  to  the  implementation  of  the 
policy) in all costings. 
3.39 Agencies also suggested some improvements that could be made to the 
information  request  process,  including  better  coordination  of  multiple 
concurrent  requests,  consideration  of  the  time  allowed  for  providing 
information and  the opportunity  to provide expertise  in matters  that concern 
them. These are reasonable suggestions for consideration, and there would be 
merit  in  the PBO  seeking  agencies’  formal  feedback  in  relation  to  the  above 
matters,  to  inform  future  information  requests  and  to  improve processes  for 
obtaining information. 
                                                     
94  As provided in Table 1.2. 
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4. Policy Costings 






the  financial  impact of  the proposal  in  terms of  the Government’s budgetary 
position.  
4.2 To assess  the policy  costings prepared by  the PBO  (both outside and 
during the caretaker period), the ANAO examined the: 
 demand for PBO costings and its performance in completing them; 






The nature of policy costings 
4.3 Requests  for  the  PBO  to  prepare  policy  costings  can  result  from  a 
parliamentarian’s  and  political  party’s  decision  to  develop  a  new  policy 
proposal.  Requests  can  also  be  made  to  update  existing  policy  costings 
following  the  release  of updated  economic data  (such  as  the Budget,  or  the 
Mid‐year  Economic  and  Fiscal  Outlook  (MYEFO)),  or  to  determine  the 
financial impact of a specific event (such as an increase in interest rates).  
4.4 There  are  standardised practices  for preparing policy  costings but by 
their  nature,  costings  are  sensitive  to  variables  such  as  assumptions,  data 
quality,  and  dates  of  implementation.  These  variables  can  mean  that 
considerable  professional  judgement  is  necessary  to  supplement  the 
methodology  used,  and  staff  require  quantitative  skills,  policy  development 
knowledge and experience to make these judgements.  
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4.5 Factors  that  can  influence  the  approach  taken  in  preparing  a  costing 
include the type of funding that the policy entails. Capped policies (such as a 
grants  program  that  allocates  a  fixed  amount  of  funding  for  a  particular 
purpose),  tend  to be simpler  to cost, as  the amount of money allocated  is  the 
amount the policy will cost (along with consideration of agency administrative 
expenses).  Policy  repeals  largely  reflect  known  costs  and  use  similar 
methodologies. Demand driven policies and interrelated policies (for example 
a  tax  rate  change,  or  an  uncapped  health  expenditure  program)  tend  to  be 
considerably more  complex  to  cost,  as  they often  involve  a mix of historical 
data, assumptions and professional  judgement  to consider how many parties 
will be affected, how they will respond, and how those factors will be assessed. 
The  following  example  illustrates  a  policy  costing  of  medium  complexity 
released in the 2013 caretaker period.  
Example: Millionaires Tax (Australian Greens) 
The policy proposal involved introducing an additional five per cent tax on personal 
incomes in excess of $1 million, with income including reportable fringe benefits. 
In costing this policy, the PBO considered timing assumptions about collecting the 
tax (quarterly for identified millionaires, but annually for one-off millionaires), and 
departmental expenses (the Australian Taxation Office would need additional 
administrative resources). The PBO also considered the behaviour of affected 
individuals, using data from the United Kingdom about the introduction of a similar 
increase in income tax. This led to the PBO assuming that some individuals would 
reduce their declarable income below $1 million, and some would bring forward 
their declaration of income prior to the tax’s introduction. Both scenarios reduced 
the amount of tax collected. 
The PBO estimated the effect of this policy using a 16 per cent sample of 
de-identified taxpayer data supplied by the Australian Taxation Office. This enabled 
the application of the $1 million income definition to an actual sample of taxpayer 
data. Results were then extrapolated to the total number of individuals earning in 
excess of this amount. 
The PBO’s costing projected an increase in the Government’s underlying cash and 
fiscal balances by $526.9 million over the 2013–14 forward estimates period, 
comprising $530 million in additional revenue (less $3.1 million in agency 
expenses). The costing was considered to be of medium reliability, as, while the 
costing was based on actual taxpayer data, it also contained a number of 
assumptions about the behavioural effects of the policy. 
Source: PBO, Post-Election Report, 18 October 2013, pp. 260–262. 
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Legislative arrangements for the PBO to conduct policy costings 
4.6 In relation to policy costings, the PS Act requires the PBO to: 




under  the  Charter  of  Budget  Honesty,  if  the  Parliamentary  Budget 
Officer  has  not  issued his/her  own written principles. At  the  time  of 
conducting this audit, the Parliamentary Budget Officer had not issued 
his  own  costing  principles,  so  the  requirements  of  the  Charter  of 
Budget Honesty applied to all of the PBO’s costings (both outside and 
during the caretaker period). 
4.7 The  Secretaries  of  Treasury  and  Finance  have  jointly  issued  written 




Costing obligations under the Charter Guidelines 
The Secretaries will aim to be clear, transparent and timely in costing policies. In 
undertaking policy costings, the Secretaries will: 
 endeavour to provide their best estimate of the full cost of a policy (including 
departmental expenses where requested and feasible); 
 endeavour to complete the costing in the shortest time possible, generally 
within five business days (noting that where additional information is 
required, the five days will exclude the time taken to obtain the additional 
information); 
 cost policies in a manner consistent with methodologies used to prepare the 
Budget statements and fiscal reports required under the Charter of Budget 
Honesty; 
 cost Government, Opposition and minority party policies in a consistent 
manner; 
 only provide financial costings, and not provide policy advice or 
assessments of the economic impact of policies; and  
 produce a self-contained written report on the costing that fully justifies the 
published costings. 
Source:  Commonwealth of Australia, Charter Guidelines, 2012, p. 12.  
4.8 The  Charter  Guidelines  also  outline  potential  methodology,  costing 
conventions  and  proforma  for  requesting  a  costing,  as  well  as  for  publicly 
Policy Costings 
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Applying  standardised practices  such as  the Charter of Budget Honesty and 
the Charter Guidelines  encourages  a  consistent  approach when  analysing or 
comparing costings. This is particularly applicable during the caretaker period, 
where policy costings are publicly released by the PBO on its website, and by 
Treasury  and  Finance  on  http://www.electioncostings.gov.au/.  Both websites 
are linked to each other. 
Policy costings outside and during the caretaker period 
4.9 There are differences in who can ask for a policy costing from the PBO, 
Treasury or Finance outside or during  the caretaker period,   and whether or 
not  the costing can be prepared on a confidential basis. These differences are 
summarised in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Who can request and conduct costings 
Parliamentarian Requested of 
Treasury or Finance 
Requested of 
the PBO 
Costings may be 
kept confidential 
Costing requests submitted outside the caretaker period 
Party in government  Yes Yes Yes 
Opposition and minor parties No(1) Yes Yes 
Independents No(1) Yes Yes 
Private members No Yes Yes 
Costing requests submitted during the caretaker period(2) 
Party in government(3) Yes(4) Yes(4) No 
Party with < five members No Yes No 
Party with ≥ five members(3) Yes(4) Yes(4) No 
Independents No Yes No 
Individual party members No No - 
Source: ANAO analysis of the PS Act, Charter Guidelines and PBO Guidance 03/2013, Election Policy 
Costings in the Caretaker Period for the 2013 General Election. 
Note 1: Exceptions have existed, such as an agreement between the former Government, the Australian 
Greens and three independent Members, that allowed access to government departments for 
policy costings and analysis, with prior approval from the Prime Minister. 
Note 2: For the purpose of costing policies, the caretaker period ends on the Friday before polling day. 
Note 3: Known as a designated parliamentary party. The PBO is required to publish in the Post-Election 
Report those costings considered to have a material impact on the Budget, regardless of whether 
the policies were submitted for costing outside or during the caretaker period.  
Note 4: Duplicate costings cannot be requested from both the PBO and Treasury/Finance. 
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4.10 There  are  also  differences  in  the  policy  costing  roles  of  the  PBO, 





 Treasury  and  Finance provide  advice  to  the Government  outside  the 
caretaker period, including proposing and analysing policy options. In 
comparison, the PBO advised that it does not provide policy advice. 
Costings conducted by the Parliamentary Budget Office 
The PBO’s performance 
4.11 The  PBO  monitors  and  reports  the  number  of  requests  from 
parliamentarians (costings and information requests) and its responsiveness, in 
its  Annual  Report  and  to  the  Senate  Finance  and  Public  Administration 
Legislation  Committee.  Since  the  PBO  began  accepting  costing  requests  in 
September 2012 to 30 April 2014, there have been 1101 requests for costings or 
information  made  by  parliamentarians  and  the  PBO  has  completed 
969 requests  (103  of  these  requests  were  withdrawn,  leaving  29  requests 
outstanding at the time of preparing this report). Table 4.2 reports PBO data on 
the  number  of  requests  received  (both  outside  and  during  the  caretaker 
period), and the time taken to complete them for this period. The PBO advised 
that from May 2014, it will report the total number of policy options requested 




days  in  the  last quarter of  2013. The PBO’s  2012–13 Annual Report  explains 
that  improvements  in  responsiveness  were  due  to  the  progressive 
implementation  of  processes  and  procedures,  developing  models  and 
modelling capability, refining processes for obtaining data from agencies, and 
increased  staff  resources becoming  available.  It  is  important  to note  that  the 
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Table 4.2: Number of requests from parliamentarians and the PBO’s 













2012 Sep 32 - 32 54.6 - 
2012 Qtr 4 165 6 159 43.4 - 
2013 Qtr 1 75 3 72 25.0 - 
2013 Qtr 2 351 67 284 24.0 - 
2013 Qtr 3 395 26 369 7.2 - 
2013 Qtr 4 2 1 1 15.0 - 
2014 Qtr 1 20 - 11 -(1) 9 
2014 April 61 - 41 -(1) 20 
Total 1101 103 969 - 29 
Source: PBO data.  
Note 1: This average has not been calculated as requests were outstanding at this time. 




of  the PBO’s operation. Both of  these stakeholders attributed  the delay  to  the 
PBO’s  difficulty  in  obtaining  information  from  agencies,  and  noted  that  the 
PBO’s responsiveness had improved over time. Both parties also reported fast 




The PBO’s workload 
4.14 During  a  Senate  Finance  and  Public  Administration  Legislation 
Committee  hearing  in  February 2013,  the  Parliamentary  Budget  Officer 




95  Appendix 3 contains a list of all stakeholders consulted by the ANAO. 
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4.15 To assess  the PBO’s request workload over  time,  the ANAO analysed 
the  PBO’s  request  records  for  10 September  2012  to  2  May  2014.  Figure  4.1 
represents the weekly requests on hand, calculated by the number of requests 
received minus the number completed and withdrawn for this period. 
Figure 4.1: Weekly requests on hand, 10 September 2012 to 2 May 2014 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of PBO data. 
Note: The Post-Election Report records are not technically requests, but are representative of workload 
for the PBO. No start date is recorded, so a notional start date has been used (the election on 
7 September 2013). 
4.16 This  analysis  shows  a  peak  of  326  requests  outstanding  prior  to  the 
caretaker  period  (80 of  these  were  withdrawn  and  are  discussed  in 
paragraph 4.18).  In  addition,  during  the  caretaker  period  the  PBO  received 
85 requests  for  costings,  and  all  were  completed  before  polling  day 
(7 September 2013),  in an average  response  time of 2.2 business days. During 
the  post‐election  reporting  period  the  PBO  completed  283  costings 
(85 caretaker  costings  and  198  other  publicly  announced  costings).  Of  these 
283 costings, 141 were for capped amounts, 124 were re‐costings of previously 
costed policies  (requiring updating  for parameter changes and  in some cases 
policy variations), and 18 were new costings. Many of the requests for capped 
amount costings were updates to previous PBO costings, and this enabled the 
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significant  number  of  new  costing  requests  during  the  caretaker  period,  for 
which  it had no costing models or data,  the same outcome would have been 
very challenging, if not impossible, to achieve.  
Levelling the playing field 
4.17 Among  other  things,  the  establishment  of  the  PBO  was  expected  to 
level  the  playing  field  for  all  parliamentarians  by  providing  access  to 
independent policy costings and support to scrutinise the budget. To assess the 
use  of  the  PBO’s  services,  the  ANAO  analysed  the  number  of  requests  by 
category of parliamentarian  from September 2012  to  the end of  the caretaker 
period  in October  2013. The parliamentary parties  requests  are  illustrated  in 
Figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2: Requests by parliamentary party, September 2012 to 
October 2013 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of PBO data. 
4.18 Figure 4.2 shows that there was a broad uptake of the PBO’s services by 
the Coalition and the Australian Greens in the lead up to the election (500 and 
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4.19 All of  the parliamentary stakeholders and  four of  the  five peer group 
members consulted by  the ANAO reported  that  the PBO had helped  to  level 
the  playing  field  across  the  Parliament.  This  was  attributed  to  previously 













Figure 4.3: Caretaker costing requests per parliamentary party and 
costings completed per department, 2007, 2010 and 2013 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of data from the http://www.electioncostings.gov.au/ website for 2007, 2010 and 
2013 and the PBO’s website for 2013.  
Note:  There were also 43 costing requests made in 2007 and 12 in 2010 that were not completed, as 
they were submitted too late within the timeframe for Treasury and Finance to prepare. 
4.21 Figure 4.3 shows that the total number of costings prepared during the 
caretaker periods  for  the past  three elections has  remained  fairly similar, but 
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PBO.  The  comparison  of  workload  between  departments  that  prepared 
caretaker period costings needs to be made with some caution, as prior to the 
caretaker period the Government may seek costings and advice from Treasury 
and  Finance  at  any  time.  In  addition,  this  does  not  reflect  the  total  costing 
workload  of  the PBO  at  this  time,  as  the PBO had  326 requests  outstanding 
prior  to  the  caretaker  period  (discussed  in  paragraph 4.16)  along  with 
85 caretaker  costings  during  the  caretaker  period.  Notwithstanding  this,  the 





during  the  caretaker  period  for  the  2013  election.  The  Charter  of  Budget 
Honesty  specifies  that  requests  for  policy  costings made  before  polling  day 
during the caretaker period for a general election must be made public as soon 
as possible.96  In 2013,  the Government’s Economic Statement was released on 
2 August 2013,  two  days  before  the  start  of  the  caretaker  period  (on 
5 August 2013). As  the Coalition’s policies had previously been costed by  the 
PBO  in  the  lead  up  to  the  election,  the  Coalition  was  able  to  resubmit 
161 costings to be updated using the new economic statement in this two day 




4.23 In  September  2012,  the  PBO  sought  advice  from  the  Australian 
Government Solicitor about what the PS Act required in this circumstance. The 
advice made references  to  the  lack of clarity  in  the PS Act  in relation  to how 
requests made outside  the caretaker period must be  treated by  the PBO once 
the  caretaker  period  commenced.  The  Australian  Government  Solicitor 
advised  that  there  was  a  reasonable  argument  where  a  request  for  a 
confidential  policy  costing  is  made  before  the  caretaker  period  commences, 
and  the  costing  is  not  completed  prior  to  that  period,  then  the  PBO  could 
continue  to prepare  the costing confidentially before  the general election was 
held. 
                                                     
96  Clause 31(1) of the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998. 
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4.24 In  the  event,  the Coalition  released  the  costing details  of  147 election 
policies  on  5 September 2013,  two days  prior  to  polling  day  and  after  the 
election advertising blackout was  in operation. Two stakeholders raised with 
the ANAO  the matter  of  the  late  release  of policy  costings  by  the Coalition 
during  the  2013 caretaker  period.  In  their  view,  the  late  release  of  the 
Coalition’s  costings  reduced  the  transparency of  all political parties’  election 
platforms.  However,  all  five  peer  group  members  held  that  there  would 
always be an element of ‘gamesmanship’ in election costing processes, such as 




The Parliamentary Budget Office’s costing process 
4.25 Policy  costings  are  the  responsibility  of  the  PBO’s  Budget  Analysis 
Division,  although  staff  from  the  Fiscal  Policy  Analysis  Division  and 
contractors assisted during the election period. The PBO’s Operations Manual 
contains  detailed  administrative  and  technical  instructions  for  staff  on  the 
processes  to  be  followed  in  conducting  policy  costings,  both  outside  and 
during the caretaker period. This  includes an explanation of the PBO’s policy 
costing  role;  procedures  for  requesting  information  from  agencies;  timelines 
for  the  completion  of  costings;  costing  methodologies;  confidentiality;  and 
record keeping. Figure 4.4 illustrates the PBO’s policy costing process. 
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Figure 4.4: The PBO’s process for preparing policy costings 
The costing request information is 
recorded in the costing register
Request received from 
parliamentarian
Action officer and checking officer are 
assigned to prepare the costing
Do not proceed 
with costing
Is the request made in the 








Work on the costing can 
proceed
Request information from 
agencies as required
Access information from 
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on costing
Costing cleared by senior 
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Source: ANAO analysis of PBO Operations Manual. 
4.26 The  ANAO  reviewed  the  PBO’s  Operations  Manual  to  compare  its 
procedures  for  costing  policies  with  the  relevant  sections  of  the  Charter 
Guidelines.  The  Operations  Manual  appropriately  aligned  with  the  Charter 
Guidelines, and replicated items such as proformas for requesting costings and 
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quality  of  the  data  sources  and  the  predictability  of  the  behaviour  of  the 
individuals or bodies to which the policy will apply.98  
4.27 The  receipt and progress of costing  requests  is  recorded  in  the PBO’s 
Costing  Register,  a  spreadsheet  that  also  generates  reports  for  the  PBO 
Executive. The ANAO’s examination of the PBO’s Costing Register99 identified 




added as different  considerations of  the workload arose over  time. The PBO 
advised the ANAO that 11 fields were consistently populated (those essential 
for  tracking  and  performance  reporting).  The  PBO  started  a  new  simplified 
spreadsheet register in October 2013, which does differentiate between costing 




ANAO review of PBO compliance with costing procedures 
4.28 To  assess  whether  the  PBO’s  costings  and  information  requests 
complied  with  its  internal  procedures,  the  ANAO  reviewed  an  indicative 
sample  of  240  records  from  the  PBO’s  costing  register.100  The  sample 





97  The Charter Guidelines contain standard conventions for the preparation of fiscal costings, such as: 
costings will be on a current price basis; economic data and forecasts will be consistent with the most 
recent reports released under the Charter of Budget Honesty; costings will be on a June financial year 
basis, for the current year and the following three financial years; and assumptions used in costings will 
be based on the best professional judgment of the Secretaries of Treasury or Finance, or the 
Parliamentary Budget Officer. 
98  At the time of preparing this report, the PBO was reviewing its reliability ratings. 
99  Dated from September 2012 to October 2013. 
100  Of the 240 records, 24 were information requests rather than costings. 
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100  Of the 240 records, 24 were information requests rather than costings. 
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Table 4.3: ANAO sample 
Record type Number of records Number tested Percentage tested 
Outside caretaker 933 162 17 
Caretaker 164 32 20 
Post-Election Report 223 46 21 
Total 1320 240 18 
Source: ANAO extraction of sample records from the PBO’s costing register. 
4.29 The costings were assessed against key procedural criteria set out in the 
PBO’s Operations Manual. A summary of  the ANAO’s results  is provided  in 
Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Results of ANAO review of the PBO’s request records 









Sign-off checklist appropriately signed 142 15 83 90 
Sign-off checklist saved 144 13 83 92 
Reliability rating included in costing response 150 1 89 99 
Parliamentary Budget Officer’s approval 
saved  
183 0 57 100 
Parliamentarian’s request template saved 193 0 47 100 
Costing minute saved 178 0 62 100 
PBO response letter saved 164 0 76 100 
Assumptions, data sources and methodology 
documented and saved  
164 0 76 100 
Caretaker period only     
Parliamentarian’s covering letter saved 21 0 219 100 
Confirmation that costing was not a duplicate 
with Treasury/Finance 
19 0 221 100 
Source: ANAO review of PBO request records.  
Note 1: Not applicable can apply in circumstances such as requests being withdrawn, a costing step not 
applying to an information request or a Post-Election Report costing, or a template not being in use 
at that time (some early work occurred before the sign-off checklist was developed). 
Note 2: The not applicable records were excluded from the percentage calculation for ‘met criteria’. 
4.30 Results from the ANAO’s examination found general compliance with 
the  PBO’s  established  procedures  for  preparing  individual  costings  and 
information  responses.  Requests  and  responses  were  found  in  all  cases. 
Importantly,  the  assumptions,  data  and  methodology  used  in  preparing 
 
ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 












relevant  documents  if  needed.  In  particular,  all  staff  receive  training  in  the 
records management system and the Operations Manual contains guidance on 
filing  conventions  and  processes.  However,  the  lack  of  ready  access  to 
complete documentation relating to a particular costing or information request 
in  that  record’s  electronic  file,  creates  the  risk  of  loss  of  continuity  of 
knowledge as costings are revisited or similar costings are prepared.  
Advice to parliamentarians 
4.32 Treasury and Finance provide policy advice  to government outside of 
the  caretaker  period,  including  proposing  and  analysing  policy  options.  In 
contrast,  the PBO  advised  that  it does not provide policy  advice because  its 
mandate  is  to provide  independent and non‐partisan analysis, and providing 
policy advice could bring the PBO’s impartiality into question. This position is 
consistent  with  the  costing  obligations  under  the  Charter  Guidelines  (see 
paragraph 4.7) 
4.33 The  PBO’s  practice  has  been  to  prepare  costings  on  the  basis  of  the 
parameters provided by the requestor, and not to provide advice and feedback 
on  the merits, or  feasibility, of  the policy or  its parameters. The PBO advised 
that while policy parameters are taken as specified by the requestor, the PBO 
does make independent assumptions on which to base the costing if required, 
such  as  the  behavioural  responses  expected  from  a policy  change. The PBO 
also advised  that  the reasons  for adoption of  the assumptions are detailed  in 
the  formal  costing  minute  provided  to  the  requesting  parliamentarian.  In 
practice, where some caution has been required,  the PBO has added a caveat 
such as in the case of costing a major savings initiative (the Coalition‘s election 
policy  Reduce  Public  Service  headcount  by  12,000  through  natural  attrition),  the 
PBO included the caveat: 
 
ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 












relevant  documents  if  needed.  In  particular,  all  staff  receive  training  in  the 
records management system and the Operations Manual contains guidance on 
filing  conventions  and  processes.  However,  the  lack  of  ready  access  to 
complete documentation relating to a particular costing or information request 
in  that  record’s  electronic  file,  creates  the  risk  of  loss  of  continuity  of 
knowledge as costings are revisited or similar costings are prepared.  
Advice to parliamentarians 
4.32 Treasury and Finance provide policy advice  to government outside of 
the  caretaker  period,  including  proposing  and  analysing  policy  options.  In 
contrast,  the PBO  advised  that  it does not provide policy  advice because  its 
mandate  is  to provide  independent and non‐partisan analysis, and providing 
policy advice could bring the PBO’s impartiality into question. This position is 
consistent  with  the  costing  obligations  under  the  Charter  Guidelines  (see 
paragraph 4.7) 
4.33 The  PBO’s  practice  has  been  to  prepare  costings  on  the  basis  of  the 
parameters provided by the requestor, and not to provide advice and feedback 
on  the merits, or  feasibility, of  the policy or  its parameters. The PBO advised 
that while policy parameters are taken as specified by the requestor, the PBO 
does make independent assumptions on which to base the costing if required, 
such  as  the  behavioural  responses  expected  from  a policy  change. The PBO 
also advised  that  the reasons  for adoption of  the assumptions are detailed  in 
the  formal  costing  minute  provided  to  the  requesting  parliamentarian.  In 
practice, where some caution has been required,  the PBO has added a caveat 
such as in the case of costing a major savings initiative (the Coalition‘s election 




ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 
The Administration of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
 
95 
A  tight  constraint  on  both  the  engagement  of  new  ongoing  staff  and 
re‐engagement  of  non‐ongoing  staff  will  be  required  for  this  policy  to  be 
implemented  through  natural  attrition  without  recourse  to  additional 
redundancy payments.101 
Quality of the Parliamentary Budget Office costings 
4.34 General acceptance of the quality of the PBO’s work is paramount in it 
gaining  the  trust  of  the  Parliament  as  a  valued  source  of  budget  and  fiscal 
policy analysis.102 To assess the quality of the PBO’s policy costings, the ANAO 
examined  the  PBO’s  quality  control  process;  compared  election  costings 
prepared  for  the  2007,  2010  and  2013  elections  with  relevant  budget 
documents,  and  sought  views  from  stakeholders  who  had  used  the  PBO’s 
costing services. 
PBO’s quality control process 
4.35 The  PBO  has  documented  its  quality  control  process  in  the  PBO 
Operations  Manual,  and  it  involves  an  assigned  ‘checking  officer’  for  each 
costing: questioning  the  costing methodology  for  conformance  to  the  costing 
guidelines; verifying  that data  sources are  relevant and up  to date;  checking 
the  reasonableness  and  logic  of  assumptions;  and  proof  reading  costing 
documentation. The PBO advised the ANAO that the sign‐off checklist and the 
version  history  of  costing minutes  are  the  cornerstones  of  this  process.  The 
ANAO confirmed that PBO executive staff also appropriately review costings 
prior  to  dissemination  for  accuracy  and  consistency,  and  their  approval  is 
recorded on the costing’s sign‐off checklist.  
4.36 While  the ANAO  found evidence of quality  control  for all applicable 




101  PBO, Post-election report of election commitments—2013 general election, Commonwealth of Australia, 
18 October 2013, p. 198. 
102  As discussed in paragraph 2.6, this was one of two key priorities in the PBO’s first annual work plan. 
 
ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 
The Administration of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
 
96 
Table 4.5: Results of ANAO review of quality control 
Quality control rating Met criteria Percentage(1) 
Rating 1: versions of costing minute and/or spreadsheet 
created by the costing officer. 
 38  18 
Rating 2: versions of costing minute and/or spreadsheet, 
and a version created by any senior officer. 
 102  48 
Rating 3: versions of costing minute and/or spreadsheet, 
and commentary from a senior officer detailing their 
considerations with respect to the draft costing. 
 72  34 
Not applicable(2)  28  - 
Total  240  100 
Source: ANAO review of PBO request records. 
Note 1: The not applicable records were excluded from the percentage calculation. 
Note 2: Not applicable was recorded for requests that were withdrawn before finalisation, and for 




advice  given).  The  PBO  advised  that  its  focus  has  been  on  recording 
completion of the process, and who was responsible at each stage, rather than 
recording the reasons for any changes the the costings. The PBO also advised 
that  the  lack  of  comments  could  also  reflect  that  a  costing  was  unchanged 
throughout  the  checking  and  approval  process. As  part  of  its  ‘After Action 
Review‘  in  late  2013,  the  PBO  reviewed  its  quality  control  processes,  and 
improvements  are planned  to:  reinforce  the  accountability  of  the  action  and 
checking officers  in ensuring  the costing  is correct; develop  training modules 
for staff; and  investigate the use of publication software to reduce the editing 
time  for  documents.  Along  with  these  improvements,  the  PBO  is  also 
considering incorporating a function to relate the version cleared with the user 
name of  the officer  that cleared  that version. This would assist accountability 
and transparency. 
Comparison of election costings 
4.38 As discussed, policy costings are estimates prepared at a point in time 
based  on  available  data  and  agreed  parameters.  In  the  Australian  context, 
policy costings prepared for the successful party at an election (whether by the 
PBO, Treasury or Finance) will form the new Government’s election platform. 
The policies  forming  this platform will be  re‐costed by government agencies 
during subsequent Budget preparations. The ANAO compared  the difference 
 
ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 
The Administration of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
 
96 
Table 4.5: Results of ANAO review of quality control 
Quality control rating Met criteria Percentage(1) 
Rating 1: versions of costing minute and/or spreadsheet 
created by the costing officer. 
 38  18 
Rating 2: versions of costing minute and/or spreadsheet, 
and a version created by any senior officer. 
 102  48 
Rating 3: versions of costing minute and/or spreadsheet, 
and commentary from a senior officer detailing their 
considerations with respect to the draft costing. 
 72  34 
Not applicable(2)  28  - 
Total  240  100 
Source: ANAO review of PBO request records. 
Note 1: The not applicable records were excluded from the percentage calculation. 
Note 2: Not applicable was recorded for requests that were withdrawn before finalisation, and for 




advice  given).  The  PBO  advised  that  its  focus  has  been  on  recording 
completion of the process, and who was responsible at each stage, rather than 
recording the reasons for any changes the the costings. The PBO also advised 
that  the  lack  of  comments  could  also  reflect  that  a  costing  was  unchanged 
throughout  the  checking  and  approval  process. As  part  of  its  ‘After Action 
Review‘  in  late  2013,  the  PBO  reviewed  its  quality  control  processes,  and 
improvements  are planned  to:  reinforce  the  accountability  of  the  action  and 
checking officers  in ensuring  the costing  is correct; develop  training modules 
for staff; and  investigate the use of publication software to reduce the editing 
time  for  documents.  Along  with  these  improvements,  the  PBO  is  also 
considering incorporating a function to relate the version cleared with the user 
name of  the officer  that cleared  that version. This would assist accountability 
and transparency. 
Comparison of election costings 
4.38 As discussed, policy costings are estimates prepared at a point in time 
based  on  available  data  and  agreed  parameters.  In  the  Australian  context, 
policy costings prepared for the successful party at an election (whether by the 
PBO, Treasury or Finance) will form the new Government’s election platform. 
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in amounts costed  for election policies of  the  incoming government with  the 
relevant budget documents for the 2007 and 2010 elections (the 2008 and 2011 
budget,  respectively).  For  the  2013  election,  the ANAO  sought  the  views  of 
Treasury  and  Finance  in  relation  to  PBO  policy  costings  that  were 
subsequently prepared for the 2014 Budget process.  
4.39 As  previously  discussed,  care  needs  to  be  taken  in  comparing  the 
caretaker  costing  workload  of  departments.  Similar  care  is  needed  in 
comparing  the  election  commitments  for  the  different  years,  as  changes  to 
costings  may  occur  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  including  changed  policy 
specifications, differences  in methodology  or  changes  in parameters  such  as 
growth  rates.  The  differences  between  governments  also  needs  to  be 
considered,  as:  2007  was  the  year  that  the  Australian  Labor  Party  won  the 
election  from  the Coalition; 2010 was  the year of  the Australian Labor Party 
formed a minority Government; and 2013 was the year that the Coalition came 
into government. These changes had an effect on  the  final policies  that went 
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Table 4.6: Comparison of election commitment costings data for 2007, 
2010 and 2013 
Category 2007 2010 2013 





Number of election commitment 
costings completed for the incoming 








Number of the incoming 
Government’s costings that were 
assessed by the ANAO(2) 
118 86 113(3) 
Number of costings with no variance 
in the subsequent budget papers 
(percentage) 
67 (57%) 60 (70%) 47 (42%) 
Number of costings with a variance 
in the subsequent budget papers 
(percentage) 
51 (43%) 26 (30%) 66 (58%) 
Costings with a variance to subsequent Budget papers 
Average variance 54% 54% 24% 
Range of variance  1% to 536% 1% to 307% 2% to 261% 
Reasons for variance 
Policy change 47% 42% 42% 
Other reason(4) 53% 58% 58% 
Source: ANAO analysis of: www.electioncostings.gov.au for 2007, 2010, and 2013; relevant MYEFO and 
Budget papers; and advice from Treasury and Finance relating to the 2014 Budget. 
Note 1: The 2007 and 2010 costings were requested and prepared during caretaker periods. In 2013, the 
Coalition did not submit any policies for costing during the caretaker period in 2013. The 
179 costings for the Coalition were included in the PBO’s Post-Election Report. 
Note 2: Not all of the election commitments could be identified in the subsequent budget papers, for 
reasons such as the commitments not becoming policy, or policy or portfolio changes making the 
policy difficult to identify. 
Note 3: The Coalition‘s 2013 Paid Parental Leave Scheme (and the associated company tax rate changes) 
was not assessed, as provision for this policy was included in the Contingency Reserve of the 
2014–15 Budget. Australian Government, Budget Strategy and Outlook: Budget Paper No. 1, 
Statement 6: Expenses and Net Capital Investment: 2014–15, 2014, p. 6-47. 
Note 4: Other reasons for variance in costs includes differing assumptions, costing methodologies and 
modelling approaches, the use of more up-to-date data, departmental expenses or differences that 
were not possible for the ANAO to review using publically available documents. 
4.40 For 2007 and 2010, the average variance between election commitments 
and  the cost given  in  the corresponding Budget papers was within  the same 
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the  2013  figure  of  58 per cent,  the  range  of  the  variances was  lower  in  2013 
(2 to 261 per cent). These figures would suggest that policies costed during the 
2013  election  period  were  more  comparable  with  Budget  costings  than  the 
previous  election period  costings. The  greater  comparability may have  been 
influenced by political parties’ access to the PBO in the year leading up to the 
election, allowing for greater refinement of policies.  
4.41 Of  the  2013  election  commitments,  Treasury  and  Finance  provided 
advice about the costings that had major variances103, and the reasons for this 
variability. A summary of the primary reasons (as differences in some costings 
were attributed  to more  than one  factor)  for difference  in  the 26 PBO election 
costings is provided in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Reasons attributed to 2013 election costing variances 
Reasons attributed to variance Number of 
occurrences 
Policy change or change in policy specifications  11 
Different costing methodology or modelling approach used  6 
Different assumptions were used for the effects of the policy  6 
Unknown, as the PBO did not publish detailed assumptions  2 
More up to date data was available for the MYEFO costing  1 
Agency administrative expenses  - 
Total  26 
Source: ANAO analysis of advice provided by Treasury and Finance. 
4.42 In  the  ANAO’s  assessment,  the  explanation  for  the  variance  is 
reasonable  for  these  costings,  and  appears  to  be  a  product  of  the  nature  of 
policy  costings—estimates  that  are  subject  to  change.  On  this  topic, 
stakeholder’s  views  about  the  variability  of  costing  results  included  a  peer 
group member stressing  that costings are subject  to many variables, and  that 
differences in assumptions and exchange rates for example, will cause costings 
to  change.  Representatives  from  a  parliamentary  party  concurred  with  this 
view,  and  noted  that previous  costings prepared  by  the PBO, Treasury  and 
Finance are all subject to the same variables.  
                                                     
103  Of the 66 costings with a variance, 40 had a variance less than six per cent or a dollar value less than 
$5 million. The ANAO asked Treasury and Finance to comment on the remaining 26 costings. 
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Stakeholders‘ views about the PBO’s service 
4.43 Of the parliamentary and peer group stakeholders who were consulted 




 three  peer  group  stakeholders  reporting  that  the  PBO  had  helped  to 
depoliticise  the  election  costing process, with one  advising  that  there 










4.44 The ANAO  also  asked  these  stakeholders  for  views  about  the PBO’s 




4.45 Stakeholders  also  reported  that  the  opportunity  to  confidentially 
request  policy  costings  and  the  flexibility  to  have  them  re‐costed  multiple 
times prior to an election period contributes to robust policy development. One 




PBO  provided  useful  commentary  on  what  the  policy  involves,  perhaps 
including things that the party had not considered.104 
                                                     
104  As discussed in paragraph 4.32, the PBO does not provide policy advice. The PBO can however meet 
with requestors to clarify aspects of the policy, and due to time constraints during the caretaker period, 
the PBO advised the ANAO that it had greater flexibility outside the caretaker period for such meetings. 
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4.46 The PBO has made  a  significant  contribution  to  levelling  the playing 
field  for  all  parliamentarians,  as  for  the  first  time  all  have  access  to 
independent  policy  costing  and  budget  expertise  during  all  periods  of  the 
Parliamentary  cycle.  Prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  PBO,  only  the 
Government  had  access  to  costing  services  (through  Commonwealth 
departments) prior to the caretaker period before a federal election. Changes to 
the Charter of Budget Honesty now also allow access by the minor parties to 
costing  services  during  the  caretaker  period,  as  previously  only  the 
government and the opposition could access the services. 
4.47 Parliamentary  and  peer  group  stakeholders  were  generally 
complimentary  of  the  PBO’s  work,  and  agreed  that:  the  PBO  provides  an 
invaluable  costing  service;  the  costings  were  of  high  quality;  the  PBO  was 
professional  to  deal  with;  and  the  process  gave  greater  integrity  to  policy 
development. The PBO advised that  it does not provide policy advice and  its 
practice  has  been  to  provide  costings  on  the  basis  of  the  parameters  of  the 
requestor. Where  the  PBO  has  departed  from  this  practice,  such  as  using  a 
different  assumption  to  that  of  the  requestor,  the  formal  costing  minute 
contains details of the reasons. 
4.48 While  the  ANAO’s  examination  of  240  costing  files  found  general 
adherence to internal procedures, the PBO’s compliance with these procedures, 
and  documentation  supporting  the  PBO’s  quality  control  process,  could  be 
improved. The PBO has advised  that  it  intends  incorporating quality control 





commitments  and  the  cost  given  in  the  corresponding  Budget  papers  was 
lower for 2013. Of the costings prepared by the PBO in 2013 for the incoming 
government, the explanations for the costings with the greatest variances was 
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5. The Post-Election Report and Other 
Functions 
This  chapter  examines  the PBO’s  approach  to preparing  the Post‐Election Report  of 
Election  Commitments,  the  self‐initiated  research  prepared  by  the  agency,  and  the 
PBO’s  lessons  learnt  after  the  2013  election.  Stakeholders’  views  about  the  PBO’s 
contribution to transparency of fiscal and budgetary frameworks are also discussed. 
Introduction 
5.1 On  its  establishment,  the  PBO  was  expected  to  improve  the 
transparency of Australia’s fiscal and budgetary frameworks and help level the 
playing  field  by  giving  all  parliamentarians  access  to  independent  policy 
costings and budgetary advice. Prior to the 2013 election, the PBO’s two policy 
costing  functions  (prepare  policy  costings  outside  the  caretaker  period,  and 
during the caretaker period) had been the most time consuming. However, the 
functions primarily contributing  to  increased  transparency are  the  last  two of 




reviewed  the PBO’s processes  for preparing  the Post‐Election Report and  its 
self‐initiated  research  as well  as  seeking views  on  the PBO’s  contribution  to 




5.3 The PBO  is  required  to prepare a post‐election  report on  the  election 
commitments of designated parliamentary parties within 30 days after the end 
of the caretaker period for a general election. The report incorporates estimates 
of  the policies  taken  to an  election by designated parliamentary parties,  and 
the  total  combined  impact of  those policies on  the Budget. The post‐election 
report  function was not  included  in  the original PBO  legislation but  resulted 
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from  a  legislative  amendment  in  2013,  and  was  intended  to  enhance 
transparency in fiscal policy debate in Australia.105 
5.4 In  the  Bill’s  passage  through  Parliament,  Members  from  the 
Government and the Opposition advocated for the need to limit the ability of 
parties  to avoid  electoral  scrutiny of  their  election  commitments. Previously, 
scrutiny could be avoided by failing to submit—or failing to submit in a timely 
manner—policies  to  be  costed  by  Treasury  or  Finance  during  the  caretaker 
period.  During  this  debate,  the  then  Parliamentary  Secretary  to  the  Prime 
Minister stated that the amendment would: 
...  place  the  role  of  a  post‐election  audit  in  the  hands  of  the  Parliamentary 
Budget  Office’  and  that  ‘[it]  is  an  important  reassurance  to  the  Australian 
people, that  if a party attempts to circumvent the Charter of Budget Honesty 
they  will  be  caught  in  the  noose  of  the  Parliamentary  Budget  Office’s 
post‐election audit. It is a guarantee to the Australian people that they should 
have costed policies put in front of them.’106 
The process for preparing the Post-Election Report  
5.5 Preparing  the  2013 Post‐Election Report was  the  responsibility of  the 
Fiscal  Policy  Analysis  Division,  and  involved  identifying  the  publicly 
announced policies of designated parliamentary parties  that required costing 
and the impact those policies would have on the budget. Policies that did not 
require  costing  include  those  that  involve no  funding,  those  that would not 
have  a material  impact  on  the Commonwealth  budget  estimates,  and  those 
that were aspirational rather than commitments.  
5.6 A designated parliamentary party  is defined  as  a political party  if  at 
least  five members  were  members  of  Parliament  immediately  before  the 
caretaker period. For  the  2013  election,  the designated parliamentary parties 
were the Australian Labor Party, the Coalition107 and the Australian Greens. 




105  Commonwealth, Explanatory Memorandum, Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary Budget 
Officer) Bill 2013, paragraph 1.4. 
106  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 May 2013, A Leigh MP, p. 4046.  
107  Pursuant to section 64MA(2) of the PS Act, the Liberal Party of Australia and the National Party of 
Australia requested to be treated as a single Parliamentary party (the Coalition). 
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Figure 5.1: The process for preparing the Post-Election Report 
 
Source: ANAO interpretation of sections 64MA and 64MC of the PS Act.  
5.8 Work in preparation for the Post‐Election Report was undertaken well 
prior  to  the  30 day  period.  In  preparing  for  the  election,  the  PBO  began 
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Figure 5.1: The process for preparing the Post-Election Report 
 
Source: ANAO interpretation of sections 64MA and 64MC of the PS Act.  
5.8 Work in preparation for the Post‐Election Report was undertaken well 
prior  to  the  30 day  period.  In  preparing  for  the  election,  the  PBO  began 
compiling  a  workbook  of  publicly  announced  policies  from  the  designated 
parties in March 2013, nine months before the latest date the election could be 
held. The PBO conducted systematic sweeps of interviews, press releases and 
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the  first  list  of  policies  for  consideration  in  the  Post‐Election  Report. 
Preparatory work also included the creation of a ‘mock‐up’ of the report with a 
view  to  identifying  the  key  tasks  and  challenges  that  would  be  faced  in 
preparing the report. This preparatory work occurred at a time when the PBO 
was also under peak costing demand  in  the caretaker period, and  the period 
immediately prior to the caretaker period. As discussed previously (paragraph 




Contents of the report 
5.9 The  Post‐Election  Report  contains  costings  of  all  the  publicly 
announced election commitments of each designated Parliamentary party that 
the  PBO  considers  would  have  a  material  impact  on  the  Commonwealth 
budget  estimates  for  the  current  financial  year  and  the  following  three 
financial  years,  along  with  the  total  combined  impact  of  those  election 
commitments  on  the  budget.  In  some  election  years,  not  all  of  the  publicly 










5.10 As  well  as  costings  prepared  by  the  PBO,  the  Post‐Election  Report 
included  the  caretaker  costings prepared  by Treasury  and  Finance,  and  any 
other  policies  that  had  been  announced,  but  not  publicly  costed  during  the 
caretaker  period.  Table  5.1  shows  the  number  of  costings  included  in  the 
Post‐Election Report, and their origin. 
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Table 5.1: Number and type of costings in the Post-Election Report 









Total number of items 
in the Post-Election 
Report 
85 79 198 434(1) 
Source: ANAO analysis of the Post-Election Report and the PBO Costing Register. 
Note 1:  The number of costings and the total number of items do not align. This is discussed in 
paragraph 5.11.  




some  line  items were  for  fixed dollar commitments  for which a PBO costing 
was not required.  
5.12 After  the  caretaker  period,  Treasury  and  Finance  provided  the  PBO 
with  the 79 costings  they prepared. The PBO reviewed  the costings prepared 
by  Treasury  and  Finance  to  determine  that  the  costings  were  sound  and 
appropriate  for  inclusion  in  the  report.  In  compiling  the  report,  the 
Parliamentary Budget Officer exercised his discretion  to prepare new costing 
documentation  for  only  one  of  these  79  costings—a  Finance  costing  of  the 
former Government’s Medical Research  Innovation Fund policy. The  reason  for 
this  was  to  illustrate  the  headline  cash  balance  impact  of  this  election 
commitment. Finance  and  the PBO both determined  that  there would be no 
financial implications for the underlying cash balance or the fiscal balance over 
the  forward  estimates.  The  PBO,  however,  did  consider  that  the  proposal 
would  have  an  ongoing  impact  on  the  headline  cash  balance  outside  the 
forward estimates period of $101 million from 2017–18 to 2028–29. 
5.13 Of the 85 costings  in the Post‐Election Report that had been costed by 
the  PBO  as  caretaker  requests,  three  were  revised  for  publication.108  The 
Post‐Election  Report  costings  for  two  of  these  policies  had  variations  of 
13.9 per cent  and  9.8 per cent  in  the underlying  cash balance  respectively.  In 
both  cases,  these  changes  resulted  in  greater  outlays.  The  third  revised 
costing—Safer pathways for refugees—is discussed in paragraph 3.20. In the first 
case,  the  difference  was  reported  to  be  due  to  a  revision  to  costing 
                                                     
108  All three costings were for policies of the Australian Greens: A Better Paid Parental Leave Scheme; 
Increase Research and Development Investment; and Safer pathways for refugees.  
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commitment. Finance  and  the PBO both determined  that  there would be no 
financial implications for the underlying cash balance or the fiscal balance over 
the  forward  estimates.  The  PBO,  however,  did  consider  that  the  proposal 
would  have  an  ongoing  impact  on  the  headline  cash  balance  outside  the 
forward estimates period of $101 million from 2017–18 to 2028–29. 
5.13 Of the 85 costings  in the Post‐Election Report that had been costed by 
the  PBO  as  caretaker  requests,  three  were  revised  for  publication.108  The 
Post‐Election  Report  costings  for  two  of  these  policies  had  variations  of 
13.9 per cent  and  9.8 per cent  in  the underlying  cash balance  respectively.  In 
both  cases,  these  changes  resulted  in  greater  outlays.  The  third  revised 
costing—Safer pathways for refugees—is discussed in paragraph 3.20. In the first 
case,  the  difference  was  reported  to  be  due  to  a  revision  to  costing 
                                                     
108  All three costings were for policies of the Australian Greens: A Better Paid Parental Leave Scheme; 
Increase Research and Development Investment; and Safer pathways for refugees.  
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assumptions.  The  difference  in  the  second  case  was  because  an  associated 




communicated  the  reasons  for  the  changes  and  the  party  was  given  the 
opportunity to discuss the manner in which these costings were reported in the 
Post‐Election Report. 
5.14 A  parliamentary  stakeholder  reported  that  the  production  of  the 
Post‐Election  Report  involved  considerable  work  for  designated  parties  in 
preparing  their  list  of  election  commitments,  reconciling  the  list  with  that 
produced by the PBO, conducting meetings to provide clarification and, prior 
to  the  release of  the Post‐Election Report, providing comments on  the PBO’s 
draft report. The PBO noted  that  these steps were particularly difficult given 
that  the  2013  election  resulted  in  a  change  of  government.  This  caused 
difficulty  contacting  representatives  of  the  outgoing  Government  as  many 
parliamentary  staff  took  leave,  and  contact  phone  numbers  and  email 
addresses were redundant soon after the election. 
5.15 The completion of  the Post‐Election Report was a major achievement, 
and  represents  the  first  time  that  the  cost  of  all  parties’  policies  taken  to  a 
Federal  election  has  been  publicly  released.  Despite  this  achievement, 
questions have been raised about the limited attention the report received from 
the media. One peer group stakeholder reported to the ANAO that there was 
little  publicity  given  to  the  Post‐Election  Report  and  cited  a  lack  of  public 
interest  in  such matters  after  an  election. An  academic  source  held  that  the 
Post‐Election  failed  to  ‘make a significant splash  in  the media’ but  felt  that  it 
may  prove  a  useful  reference  for  politicians  and  the  media  in  the  present 
parliamentary term.109 The PBO advised that prior to the report’s release there 
were numerous  requests  for  information  from  the media, but media  interest 
waned due to the non‐controversial nature of the report once released. 
                                                     
109  Miranda Stewart and Holly Jager, ‘The Australian Parliamentary Budget Office: Shedding light on the 
dark arts of budgeting’, (2013) 24 Public Law Review 267, p. 286. 
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5.16 Research work on  the budget and  fiscal policy settings  is  the primary 
responsibility of the PBO’s Fiscal Policy Analysis Division. The PBO makes its 
research  publicly  available  on  the  internet,  with  the  intent  of  helping  to 
improve  budget  transparency  and  promote  a  better  understanding  of  the 
Budget and fiscal policy.  
5.17 During the first year of the PBO’s operation, most of its resources were 
allocated  to responding  to requests  from parliamentarians. Consequently,  the 
Fiscal  Policy  Analysis  Division  only  became  operational  in  January  2013. 
Despite  this,  the  Parliamentary  Budget  Officer  had  early  discussions  about 
potential  research  topics.  Consideration  was  given  to  the  views  of 
Parliamentarians,  and  the  2012–13 PBO work plan  encouraged  Senators  and 
Members  to make suggestions  for  inclusion  in  the PBO’s 2012–13 and  future 
work programs.  
5.18 Two  topics  for potential  research were discussed  internally; work  on 
the  underlying  structure  of  the  budget,  and  factors  that  could  affect  the 
sustainability  of  the budget  over  the medium  to  longer  term. The  structural 
budget balance  research was selected as  the  first study  to be published, as  it 
was  felt  that  this  could  be  completed within  the  resource  constraints  of  the 
available  staff,  data  was  readily  available,  and  there  was  a  demand  from 
Parliamentarians  to  update  a  similar  report  produced  by  the  Treasury  in 
2010.110  
5.19 Topics  for  future  research were discussed  in  the PBO’s 2013–14 work 
plan.  The  work  plan  gives  broad  areas  of  future  research  (whilst 
acknowledging  the  dynamic  nature  of  topic  selection)  such  as:  trends  in 
government  expenditure  and  revenue;  analysis  of  the  sensitivity  of 
expenditure  and  revenue  estimates;  national  fiscal  trends  between  the 
Commonwealth  and  the  States  and  Territories;  examination  of  the  current 
practice  of  costing  policy  proposals  and  alternative  approaches;  and  best 
practice  in  budget  reporting.  In  an  address  in  November  2013,  the 
                                                     
110  T McDonald, Y H Yan, B Ford, D Stephan, Treasury Economic Roundup Issue 3, Estimating the 
structural budget balance of the Australian Government, 2 October 2010. The paper was written by staff 
of the Treasury, and has the disclaimer, ‘The views in this article are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the Australian Treasury’. 
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structural budget balance of the Australian Government, 2 October 2010. The paper was written by staff 
of the Treasury, and has the disclaimer, ‘The views in this article are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the Australian Treasury’. 
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PBO’s structural budget balance report 
5.20 On 22 May 2013, the PBO released the report: Estimates of the structural 
budget balance of the Australian Government: 2001–02 to 2016–17, intended to help 
explain  how  underlying  budgetary  trends  and  discretionary  fiscal  policy 





the  impacts  of  underlying  budgetary  trends  and  discretionary  fiscal  policy 
decisions.112 
5.21 Such estimates can be used, in conjunction with other information such 
as  estimates  of  the  underlying  cash  balance,  to  provide  broad  guidance  on 
whether current  fiscal policy settings are sustainable over a  longer  term. The 
PBO’s  report  stated  that  regular  estimation  of  the  structural  budget  balance 
could help  inform  the  likelihood of governments being  able  to  achieve  their 
long‐term  fiscal  objectives.  In  recent  years,  similar  estimates  have  been 
conducted  by  the  OECD  and  the  IMF,  amongst  others,  but  the  only 
Commonwealth body to do so was the Treasury in 2010 and 2013. 
5.22 The  PBO’s  report  reviewed  estimation  methodologies  from 
international literature and applied these to Australia, and presented estimates 
of  the  structural  budget  balance  within  a  range.  As  with  any  analysis  that 
involves  estimation,  professional  judgement  is  necessary.  To  verify  the 
analysis, the PBO had its research peer reviewed by four external referees that 
had  experience  and  expertise  with  the  economic  and  fiscal  data  and 
methodologies used to construct structural budget balance estimates. 
                                                     
111  P Bowen, Maintaining a Focus on fiscal discipline and budget transparency: the role of the 
Parliamentary Budget Office, Address to the Carnegie Mellon Forum, Adelaide, 29 November 2013, 
p. 8. 
112  PBO, Estimates of the structural budget balance of the Australian Government 2001–02 to 2016–17, 
May 2013, p. 1. 
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of structural budget balance estimates 
Source: ANAO analysis, based on data provided by the PBO. 
5.24 In  comparing  the  PBO’s  and  Treasury‘s  structural  budget  balance 
estimates,  the PBO  included historical and  forecast estimates  from 2001–02  to 
2016–17,  whereas  the  Treasury  included  2000–01  to  2021–22  estimates.  The 
PBO is bound by the Charter of Budget Honesty to use Treasury and Finance‘s 
economic  forecasts  and  fiscal  estimates  that,  also  in  accordance  with  the 
Charter of Budget Honesty, are  for  the  current year and  the  following  three 
years. Within this context, it should be noted that by its legislation the PBO is 
specifically  precluded  from  preparing  economic  forecasts.  The  PBO  advised 
the  ANAO  that  its  estimates  had  broadly  similar  findings  to  Treasury’s 
                                                     
113  N Win, S Duggan, P Garton, S Premetis, B Li, Estimating the structural budget balance of the Australian 
Government: an update, May 2013. The paper was written by staff of the Treasury, and has the 
disclaimer, ‘The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Australian Government.’ 
114  J Minifie, Grattan Institute, The Mining Boom: impacts and prospects, July 2013, Figure 4.8, p. 40. 
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estimates.  The  difference  in  estimates  between  2008–09  and  2009–10  largely 
reflects  the removal of  the  then Government’s  temporary  fiscal stimulus  (but 
not  the  impact  on  public  debt  interest)  from  the  PBO’s  estimates  to  gain  a 
better understanding of the underlying trend in the structural budget balance 
estimates.  
5.25 In October 2012,  the PBO published  its  intent  to conduct work on  the 
underlying  structure  of  the  budget  and  the  factors  that  could  affect  the 
sustainability  of  the  budget  over  the  medium  to  longer  term  in  its  
2012–13 work  plan.  At  this  time  no  Government  estimates  of  the  structural 
budget balance had been released since 2010. Given Treasury‘s past experience 
with such estimates, the PBO met with Treasury a number of times in 2013 to 
discuss  methodologies.  At  the  same  time  as  the  PBO,  Treasury  was  also 
preparing an estimate of the structural budget balance, and its working paper 
was  released  later  on  the  same  day  as  the  PBO’s  report.  Treasury  has 




consulted  by  the  ANAO  as  a  duplication  of  work,  and  minimising  such 
duplication  was  a  topic  considered  by  the  Joint  Select  Committee.  Several 
media articles at the time were also critical of the apparent duplication of work 
by  the PBO  and Treasury. The ANAO was  advised  that  the PBO’s  research 
may  have  been  the  impetus  for  Treasury  to  publicly  release  its  analysis,  as 
Treasury had not prepared similar work since 2010. The Parliamentary Budget 
Officer has advised that he does not consider there to be a need for the PBO to 
do  further  work  on  this  subject  as  long  as  the  structural  budget  balance 
estimates are regularly updated as part of the Budget papers. 
Expenditure trends analysis  
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5.28 The historic  trends report was  intended  to provide an  insight  into  the 
key drivers of government spending over  the past decade and  their expected 
impact over the medium term. The project was challenging, as the Government 
does  not  currently  maintain  consistent  expenditure  data  at  the  function  or 
program level. This created significant data gaps, as there was a lack of readily 
available consistent  time series data on government spending at  the program 
level, which  is crucial  for analysis of expenditure  trends. The PBO expended 
considerable  effort  recording  data  from  public  documents  and  liaising with 
agencies  to  assist  in  filling  in  the  data  gaps,  to  ensure  consistency  of  its 
reporting of functional and program spending over time. 
5.29 The  PBO  compiled  a  database  using  these  details  on  which  to  base 
future analysis. In November 2013, the Parliamentary Budget Officer stated his 
intent, whenever possible, to make publicly available the datasets and models 




meeting with Treasury  and  Finance,  and  the  Secretary  of  Finance  agreed  to 
work with the PBO after the election. Work commenced in February 2014, and 
aims  to develop an approach  that will maintain  the  consistent  time  series of 
expenditure  data  at  the  program  level.  Where  possible,  the  use  of  existing 
processes is being considered to minimise resourcing requirements.  
5.31 The  two  papers  examined  by  the  ANAO  constitute  substantial 
contributions  to  public  research  into  Australia’s  fiscal  and  budget  policy 
environment and should prove useful reference documents in the longer term. 
Stakeholders consulted by the ANAO broadly supported this view. 
5.32 On  15 April  2014,  the PBO  released  a  third  research paper: Trends  in 
Australian  Government  receipts:  1982–83  to  2012–13,  intended  to  examine  the 
current  fiscal  position  of  the  Australian  Government  and  improve 
understanding of  fiscal sustainability over  time. Reflecting  its  time of release, 
this paper was not examined for the preparation of this audit report. 
                                                     
115  P Bowen, Maintaining a Focus on Fiscal Discipline and Budget Transparency: the Role of the 
Parliamentary Budget Office, Address to the Carnegie Mellon Forum, Adelaide, 29 November 2013, 
p. 8. 
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Increased transparency—fiscal and budget frameworks 
5.33 Increased transparency is seen as a method for enhancing the access of 
the legislature and the public to budget evaluation, and in turn to increase the 
accountability  of  fiscal  decision  making.116  Supporting  this  is  the  need  for 
effective communication, with both the IMF and the OECD commenting on the 
importance  of  IFIs  having  effective  communication  strategies  in  place.  The 
OECD goes on to explain that: 
... media coverage of  [IFI’s] work assists  in  fostering  informed constituencies 
that  may  then  exercise  timely  pressure  on  the  government  to  behave 
transparently and responsibly in fiscal matters.117 
5.34 While  the  PBO’s  primary  clients  are  parliamentarians,  it  was  also 
expected  that  the PBO would  improve  the  transparency  of Australia’s  fiscal 
and budgetary  frameworks  for  the public. Further,  the Parliamentary Budget 
Officer regards  the PBO’s mandate as helping  to  inform  the public debate on 
the budget and fiscal policy issues.118  
5.35 The  PBO  does  not  have  a  documented  communications  strategy  to 
guide  self‐publicity  of  its  work,  although  its  current  approach  includes  the 
Parliamentary  Budget  Officer  providing  factual  briefing  to  journalists  on 
request. The PBO also advises (by email and twitter) the media and interested 
parties of new publications, and posts these on its website. The PBO monitors 
the media  for articles on  its  research,  functions and performance, but has no 
formal process for analysing the trends in this coverage. In the absence of any 




116  M Stewart and H Jager, The Australian Parliamentary Budget Office: Shedding light on the dark arts of 
budgeting, Public Law Review, 2013 (24) p. 271. 
117  OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions, 
13 February 2014. 
118  P Bowen, Parliamentary Budget Officer, Maintaining a Focus on Fiscal Discipline and Budget 
Transparency—the Role of the Parliamentary Budget Office, Address to the Carnegie Mellon Forum, 
Adelaide, 29 November 2013, p. 2. 
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5.36 The PBO’s structural budget balance  report and  its expenditure  trend 
analysis  both  generated media  interest  upon  release119  and  the  PBO’s work, 
including policy costings and self‐initiated research, has received a modest but 
continuous,  citation  in  media  articles  and  scholarly  publications.  From 
April 2013  to  April  2014,  the  ANAO  has  counted  209  articles  on  topics 
involving  the  PBO,  policy  costings  and  the  PBO’s  research  reports.  Within 
these  articles,  there were,  as would  be  expected,  a mix  of  views,  from  very 
positive  (‘the  PBO  is  a  whistleblower’),  factual  reporting,  to  negative 
(questioning  the  validity  of  the  analysis).  In  relation  to  the  PBO’s  historic 
government spending report  there were very positive views about  the PBO’s 
achievement in drawing this information together. 
5.37 Parliamentary  and  peer  group  stakeholders  consulted  by  the ANAO 
provided mixed commentary as to whether the PBO’s activities have, to date, 
provided  improved  transparency  for  the  public  on  Australia’s  fiscal  and 
budget framework. For example: 
 peer  group  stakeholders  felt  that  transparency  had  been  improved 
(with  one  not  providing  a  view)  whereas  two  parliamentary 
stakeholders felt that transparency had not improved; 










public comes  through a better  informed Parliament, and  the PBO has 
helped  to  achieve  this.  However,  one  peer  group  member  felt  that 
further work could be done by the PBO in this regard. 
                                                     
119  As previously mentioned, the ANAO did not examine the impact of the PBO’s trends in Australian 
Government receipts report. 
120  For the period April 2013 to April 2014, the PBO issued four press releases and 36 online ‘tweets’. 
  
ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 
The Administration of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
 
114 
5.36 The PBO’s structural budget balance  report and  its expenditure  trend 
analysis  both  generated media  interest  upon  release119  and  the  PBO’s work, 
including policy costings and self‐initiated research, has received a modest but 
continuous,  citation  in  media  articles  and  scholarly  publications.  From 
April 2013  to  April  2014,  the  ANAO  has  counted  209  articles  on  topics 
involving  the  PBO,  policy  costings  and  the  PBO’s  research  reports.  Within 
these  articles,  there were,  as would  be  expected,  a mix  of  views,  from  very 
positive  (‘the  PBO  is  a  whistleblower’),  factual  reporting,  to  negative 
(questioning  the  validity  of  the  analysis).  In  relation  to  the  PBO’s  historic 
government spending report  there were very positive views about  the PBO’s 
achievement in drawing this information together. 
5.37 Parliamentary  and  peer  group  stakeholders  consulted  by  the ANAO 
provided mixed commentary as to whether the PBO’s activities have, to date, 
provided  improved  transparency  for  the  public  on  Australia’s  fiscal  and 
budget framework. For example: 
 peer  group  stakeholders  felt  that  transparency  had  been  improved 
(with  one  not  providing  a  view)  whereas  two  parliamentary 
stakeholders felt that transparency had not improved; 










public comes  through a better  informed Parliament, and  the PBO has 
helped  to  achieve  this.  However,  one  peer  group  member  felt  that 
further work could be done by the PBO in this regard. 
                                                     
119  As previously mentioned, the ANAO did not examine the impact of the PBO’s trends in Australian 
Government receipts report. 
120  For the period April 2013 to April 2014, the PBO issued four press releases and 36 online ‘tweets’. 
The Post-Election Report and Other Functions 
 
ANAO Report No.36 2013–14 
The Administration of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
 
115 
5.38 The  independent  parliamentarian  with  whom  the  ANAO  consulted 
had not had  the opportunity  to use  the PBO’s  costing  service. However,  the 
parliamentarian  was  of  the  view  that  the  PBO  had  contributed  to  greater 
knowledge  for  the  Parliament. Representatives  of  two  parliamentary parties 
concurred with this view. A representative of one party stated that it sees ‘the 
institution  as  making  an  important  and  ongoing  contribution  to  the 
Parliament’  and  another  held  that  ‘without  a  doubt,  Parliament  is  better 
informed.’  
Lessons learnt 
5.39 Following  the  completion  of  the  Post‐Election  Report,  the  PBO 
commenced  an  ‘After  Action  Review’  of  its  operations  related  to  the 




5.40 The  first  recommendation  was  for  the  development  of  a  new 
purpose‐built  registration  system  to  replace  the  current  spreadsheet  costing 
and information request registers (previously discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of 
this audit report). This is intended to: 
 provide  a  more  reliable  and  user  friendly  workflow  management 







5.42 The  implementation  of  a  workflow  management  system  should  also 
enable the PBO to address several issues raised in this audit report: 
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 improving  compliance  with  internal  procedures  for  conducting 
costings (discussed in paragraph 4.30); and  
 improving  the  recording  of  quality  control  decisions  (discussed  in 
paragraph 4.36).  
5.43 Other  recommendations  focused  on  its  client  service  delivery  for 
parliamentarians. These include: 
 continuing  with  practices  to  cater  for  periods  of  peak  workloads  by 
having a pre‐trained and already security cleared pool of consultants, 
seconding  staff  from agencies, and ensuring  that  staff  from  the Fiscal 
Policy Analysis Division are  involved  in  costing work on an ongoing 
basis; 
 continuing to develop the data repository and costing models, to assist 
with  costing  turnaround  times,  and  also  for  staff  development 
purposes, broadening  their experience of conducting different  type of 
costings;  
 reviewing  and  maintaining  the  Operations  Manual,  and  improving 
internal procedures, document  templates and developing a PBO  style 
guide to assist with producing reports in busy periods; and 
 maintaining  working  relationships  with  parliamentarians  through 
establishing  a  single  contact  person  at  the  PBO  for  each  designated 
party, and making responses and advice to parliamentarians. 
Conclusion 
5.44 While  the  principal  activity  of  the  PBO  has  been  to  prepare  policy 
costings  and  respond  to  requests  for  information  from parliamentarians,  the 
PBO has established an effective capability  to deliver on  its  important role  in 
contributing  to  the  transparency  of  Australia’s  fiscal  and  budgetary 
framework. In particular, the agency has produced: 
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 improving  compliance  with  internal  procedures  for  conducting 
costings (discussed in paragraph 4.30); and  
 improving  the  recording  of  quality  control  decisions  (discussed  in 
paragraph 4.36).  
5.43 Other  recommendations  focused  on  its  client  service  delivery  for 
parliamentarians. These include: 
 continuing  with  practices  to  cater  for  periods  of  peak  workloads  by 
having a pre‐trained and already security cleared pool of consultants, 
seconding  staff  from agencies, and ensuring  that  staff  from  the Fiscal 
Policy Analysis Division are  involved  in  costing work on an ongoing 
basis; 
 continuing to develop the data repository and costing models, to assist 
with  costing  turnaround  times,  and  also  for  staff  development 
purposes, broadening  their experience of conducting different  type of 
costings;  
 reviewing  and  maintaining  the  Operations  Manual,  and  improving 
internal procedures, document  templates and developing a PBO  style 
guide to assist with producing reports in busy periods; and 
 maintaining  working  relationships  with  parliamentarians  through 
establishing  a  single  contact  person  at  the  PBO  for  each  designated 
party, and making responses and advice to parliamentarians. 
Conclusion 
5.44 While  the  principal  activity  of  the  PBO  has  been  to  prepare  policy 
costings  and  respond  to  requests  for  information  from parliamentarians,  the 
PBO has established an effective capability  to deliver on  its  important role  in 
contributing  to  the  transparency  of  Australia’s  fiscal  and  budgetary 
framework. In particular, the agency has produced: 
 the Post‐Election Report—a major  achievement  and  the  first  time  the 
cost of all parties’ election platform policies had been publicly released; 
and 
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 several  research  papers—on  the  structural  budget  balance,  historic 
government spending trends, and the trends in Australian Government 
receipts.  The  first  two  papers  examined  by  the  ANAO  were  well 




fiscal  and  budget matters. Overall,  the work  of  the  PBO  has  contributed  to 
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Appendix 3: Stakeholders Consulted by the ANAO 
1. Commonwealth  agencies:  Australian  Bureau  of  Statistics;  Australian 
Customs  and  Border  Protection  Service;  Australian  Taxation  Office; 
Attorney‐General’s Department  and  the Departments  of: Agriculture; 
Communications;  Defence;  Education  and  Employment  (interviewed 
together as Machinery of Government changes had not yet occurred); 
the Environment; Finance; Foreign Affairs and Trade; Health; Human 
Services;  Immigration  and Border  Protection;  Industry;  Infrastructure 
and Regional Development; Prime Minister and Cabinet; the Treasury; 
Social Services; and Veterans’ Affairs. 
2. Parliamentarians:  Australian  Greens,  Australian  Labor  Party,  the 
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Better Practice Guides 
The following Better Practice Guides are available on the ANAO website: 
Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration  Dec. 2013 
Human Resource Management Information Systems: Risks and controls  June 2013 
Preparation of Financial Statements by Public Sector Entities  June 2013 
Public Sector Internal Audit: An investment in assurance and business 
improvement 
Sept. 2012 
Public Sector Environmental Management: Reducing the environmental 
impacts of public sector operations 
Apr. 2012 
Developing and Managing Contracts: Getting the right outcome, 
achieving value for money 
Feb. 2012 
Public Sector Audit Committees: Independent assurance and advice for 
chief executives and boards 
Aug. 2011 
Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities  Mar. 2011 
Strategic and Operational Management of Assets by Public Sector 
Entities: Delivering agreed outcomes through an efficient and optimal 
asset base 
Sept. 2010 
Planning and Approving Projects – an Executive Perspective: Setting the 
foundation for results 
June 2010 
Innovation in the Public Sector: Enabling better performance, driving new 
directions 
Dec. 2009 
SAP ECC 6.0: Security and control  June 2009 
Business Continuity Management: Building resilience in public sector 
entities 
June 2009 
Developing and Managing Internal Budgets  June 2008 
Agency Management of Parliamentary Workflow  May 2008 
Fairness and Transparency in Purchasing Decisions: Probity in Australian 
Government procurement 
Aug. 2007 
Administering Regulation  Mar. 2007 
Implementation of Programme and Policy Initiatives: Making 
implementation matter 
Oct. 2006 
 
  
 
